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ARTICLE
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Some of my environmental law colleagues have long lamented
that the Supreme Court is anti-environmental.' This assertion
always struck me as unlikely. Why would nine intelligent, thinking
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New York.
1 J. William Futrell, The Ungreening of the Supreme Court, ENVTL.
F., Jan.-Feb. 1992 at
12; Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the
Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 V A N DL.
. REV. 343 (1989); A. Dan
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persons be against the environment that nurtures us all? But then
Professor Richard Lazarus began counting and demonstrated that
a decided majority of the Court's environmental law decisions have
anti-environmental result^.^ Statistics alone, however, do not indicate that the Court has an anti-environmental bias. As Lazarus
suggests, the statistics could reflect the resolution of conflicts
between environmental values and other social or legal values
embodied in the Constitution, statutes, or cross-cutting legal doct r i n e ~ . Such
~
conflicts would inevitably lead to some decisions
counter to environmental values. A more qualitative analysis of
the Court's opinions might suggest whether resolution of diverging
values or an anti-environmental bias explains the majority of the
Court's decisions.
At the same time, some of the Court's environmental law decisions misconstrue the environmental statutes. Perhaps the environmental statutes are too long and complex for the Court to
grasp. Years ago my tax law professors complained that "the
Supreme Court just does not understand the Internal Revenue
C ~ d e ! " When
~
many full-time tax practitioners cannot comprehend the Code in its entirety, it may be too much to expect that the
part-time tax practitioners on the Court could do so. Perhaps the
sheer volume and complexity of environmental law, which rivals
tax law,5 makes it equally difficult for the Court to comprehend.
As a result, I have similarly complained to my students that "the
Court just does not understand the Clean Water Act" (CWA).6
Perhaps the concern of my colleagues with the apparent anti-enviTarlock, Is There a There in Environmental Law?, 19 FLA.ST. U. J. LANDUSE & ENVTL.
L. 213, 224 (2004).
2 Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law and the Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19
PACEENVTL.
L. REV.653 (2002) [hereinafter Lazarus, Three Years Later]; Richard J . Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protections Law in the Supreme Court, 17 PACEENVTL.
L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Lazarus, Thirty Years]. See also Richard J . Lazarus, Restoring
What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV.
703 (2000).
3 See Lazarus, Three Years Later, supra note 2, at 654.
4 David Hurwitz, Professor, Harvard Law School, Lecture at the Harvard Law School
(1966); Frank Sanders, Professor, Harvard Law School, Lecture at the Harvard Law School
(1967). My tax colleagues, Professors Ron Jensen and Bridgett Crawford, tell me the complaint is as valid today as it was when I was a law student.
5 The 2004 version of the Code of Federal Regulations contains: twenty volumes in Part
26, regulations of the Internal Revenue Service under the Internal Revenue Code, and
thirty volumes in Part 40, regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency under the
environmental statutes it administers. Moreover, many of the EPA volumes are larger
than the IRS volumes and the EPA volumes occupy about sixty percent more shelf space
than the IRS volumes. See 26 C.F.R. $Q 1.1-801.6 (2004); 40 C.F.R. $0 1.1-1700.13 (2004).
6 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. $9 1251-1387 (2000).
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ronmental tilt of the Court's decisions and my own concern with
the Court's apparent misunderstanding of environmental statutes
are related. The Court may not understand environmental law and
thus be prone to analytical error, which in turn could lead to antienvironmental decisions. On the other hand, the Court could mistakenly or purposefully misconstrue an environmental statute to
reach results-oriented, anti-environmental decisions. Again, a
more qualitative analysis of the Court's opinions may suggest why
the Court's environmental decisions sometimes contain analytical
errors and the relationship, if any, between the errors and antienvironmental results.
A qualitative analysis of the over 240 cases Lazarus counted7 is
beyond the scope of a single law review article. A qualitative
examination of the Court's decisions under the CWA, however, is
perfectly suited for this task. The Court has rendered twenty-three
decisions under the CWA, more than any other statute implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); enough
to form a critical mass susceptible to analysis within a single article.
Most of the Court's early CWA opinions decided before 1980
involved relatively simple issues of statutory interpretation. Additionally, these decisions were relatively unaffected by legal values
and doctrines beyond the CWA and were unanimously decided or
decided by a strong majority. The results of these early decisions
were overwhelmingly pro-en~ironmental.~
In contrast, many of the
opinions decided after 1980 involved more complex issues of statutory interpretation and were often affected by legal values and doctrines extrinsic to the CWA. These decisions were rarely
unanimous. The results of these later decisions were overwhelmingly anti-environmental. It is tempting to speculate that the
change from predominantly pro-environmental decisions to
predominantly anti-environmental decisions occurred because of a
change in the makeup of the Court, e.g., reflecting a difference
between the Burger Court and the Rehnquist Court. However, the
change from decisions with pro-environmental results to anti-environmental results occurred in 1980,1° a year when there were no
changes in Justices.
See Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra note 2 , at Appendix.
8 See infra Table A.
9 The same could be said for the Court's decisions under earlier water pollution legislation. See infra notes 21-22.
10 See infra Table B .
7
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Qualitative analysis of the decisions reveals a surprising level of
mistakes in the Court's interpretation of the CWA. In fact, twothirds of the decisions contain analytical errors,ll mischaracterizing
or acting in apparent ignorance of some statutory provisions pertinent to the issues before the Court. While these mistakes were not
always critical to the Court's decisions, the rate of error is greater
in the post-1980 decisions than in the pre-1980 decisions and the
severity of the errors is far greater in the post-1980 decisions. The
rate of mistake is also greater in decisions with anti-environmental
results than it is in decisions with pro-environmental results. Furthermore, the severity of the errors is much greater in the decisions
with anti-environmental results.
The apparent explanation for the change from decisions with
pro-environmental results to anti-environmental results and the
increase in the rate and severity of analytical errors in the Court's
decisions before and after 1980 is a change in the nature of the
CWA cases coming before the Court. Before 1980, all of the cases
sought judicial review of EPA actions or appealed federal enforcement of the CWA. After 1980, ten of the fifteen decisions were
either citizen suits, private common law nuisance actions against
polluters, or appeals of state action. Because EPA action was not
at issue in these decisions, the United States was not a party in
most of the actions, although it often filed an amicus brief. When
the United States was a party, its position did not necessarily
represent the EPA's interpretation of the CWA, especially when
the federal defendant was sued for violating the CWA.12
This suggests that the anti-environmental tilt and the analytical
mistakes resulted from a combination of the Court's ambivalence
toward citizen enforcement13 and the absence of the EPA's participation in framing the government's position explaining the CWA,
especially in cases in which the Department of Justice represented
the government as a polluter rather than as a guardian of the enviId. These errors are identified and discussed in Part 111.
In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), for instance, the Governor of
Puerto Rico sued the Secretary of the Department of Defense to enjoin practice bombing
in the ocean near Vieques Island without a CWA permit. Because the Solicitor General
represented the Department as a defendant, the brief filed by the United States represented the position of the CWA-violating Department rather than of the CWA-enforcing
EPA. See discussion of Romero-Barcelo infra pp. 156-163 and accompanying notes
168-204.
13 The dissent in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n
(Sea Clammers), 453 U.S. 1, 25 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting), commented that in its
recent decisions the Court had "been more and more reluctant to open the courthouse
door to the injured citizen."
l1
12
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ronment and of the CWA. An examination of the briefs filed by
the United States in these cases confirms this notion. A similar
examination of the Court's opinions under other environmental
statutes would indicate whether this is generally the case and might
determine which aspect of the combination is dominant.
Part I of this article sets the stage with a brief survey of federal
water pollution control, focusing on the CWA. Part I1 examines
statistical conclusions and inferences from a cursory review of the
Court's CWA opinions. Part I11 examines some of the opinions in
a more qualitative manner to determine whether the statistical conclusions withstand analysis and whether the Court understands the
CWA. The latter determination requires examining the nature and
severity of the Court's misinterpretations of the statute. Part IV
examines the Court's decisions with anti-environmental results to
determine whether they reflect an anti-environmental bias or the
other factors suggested. Table A lists the Court's opinions under
the statutes administered by the EPA, documenting that the
Court's CWA decisions outnumber those under any other EPA
administered statute. Table B contains basic information about the
Court's CWA opinions, from which the conclusions in Part I1 are
drawn.

Prior to 1972, federal water pollution legislation provided: 1)
some funding to states for building local sewage treatment plants;
2) research into the causes of, effects of, and cures for water pollution; 3) technical expertise and guidance to states on developing
water quality standards; and 4) cumbersome enforcement of poorly
established pollution control requirements.14 Frustrated with this
ineffective construct, federal regulators discovered the Refuse Act
of 1899, a neglected statute that was designed to protect channels
of navigation from siltation but read broadly enough to serve as an
14 See Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246; Water
Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903. See also EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State
Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 200-209 (1976) (examining the pre-1972 program
and contrasting it with the 1972 legislation). For a detailed account of pre-1972 efforts to
control water pollution, see William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control
in the United States-State, Local and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part 1, 22 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 145 (2003).
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effective vehicle for pollution contr01.'~ The Refuse Act required a
permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps of Engineers") to introduce refuse into navigable waters. The EPA and
the Corps of Engineers developed a permit program under which
the Corps of Engineers issued permits requiring compliance with
pollution reduction requirements specified by the EPA.16 A suit by
environmentalists effectively ended this effort by requiring environmental impact statements under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)17 to be issued with each permit.ls This set the
stage for the wholesale revamping of federal water pollution legislation in 1972.19
Although the pre-CWA water pollution control regime was
largely ineffective, a number of water pollution cases reached the
Supreme Court before enactment of that statute, including: several
federal common law disputes between states,2O three appeals under
the Refuse
and one case under oil pollution legislation later
incorporated into the CWA.22
The Constitution vests the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over disputes between states.23 As a result, states have
15 33 U.S.C. 5 407 (2000). See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Industrial Water Pollution and
the Refuse Act: A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REV.761, 762 (1971).
16 Ray M. Druley, The Refuse Act of 1899, BNA E m . REP., Monograph No. 11, Jan.
28, 1972, at 10-16.
17 42 U.S.C. $8 4321-4370f (2000).
18 Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 15 (D.D.C. 1971). See also EPA v. Cal., 426 U.S. at
203.
19 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816.
20 See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying discussion.
21 United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973) (noting that the
government may prosecute a defendant discharging refuse into a navigable water without a
permit issued by the Corps of Engineers, even in the absence of a formal program to issue
such permits, but that it was an error not to admit evidence that defendant reasonably
relied on statements by the Corps of Engineers that no permit was necessary); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224,230 (1966) (upholding a prosecution for an oil spill
from vessel against an argument that commercially valuable oil was not refuse); United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482,490 (1960) (noting that the government may
seek an injunction against discharge of industrial waste causing siltation of a channel and
noting that industrial waste was not covered by the "streets and sewers" exception).
22 Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325, 328 (1973) (holding that federal
oil spill legislation did not pre-empt state oil spill legislation absent a clear conflict). The
oil spill legislation was enacted as the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (codified prior to 1972 at 33 U.S.C. 5 1161, later incorporated into the
CWA as 5 311,33 U.S.C. 5 1321 (2000)). However, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 55 2701-2761 (2000)), largely
supplanted 5 311.
23 U.S. CONST.art. 111, 5 2, cl. 2.
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brought to the Court many of their disputes over rights to or
revolving around interstate waters. The cases have included border disputes caused by shifting boundary
disputes over
rights to use and consume common
and disputes over pollution of a downstream state's water by sources of pollution
located in other states upstream.26 Opinions in these interstate dis, ~which
~
the Court recputes culminated in Illinois v. M i l ~ a u k e ein
ognized a federal common law of nuisance caused by interstate
water pollution. The Court rendered this opinion on April 24,
1972, noting that water pollution legislation was pending and "new
federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the
field of federal common law of nuisance."28

B.

The CWA

The 1972 legislati~n?~
now commonly called the Clean Water
Act or CWA,3O divided all water pollution sources into two groups:
24 Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376,379 (1990); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 466 U.S.
96,99 (1984); Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 335,336 (1980); Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702,
707 (1973); Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252 U.S. 273,276 (1920); Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1 , 2
(1893).
Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310,312 (1984); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S.
176,177 (1982); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,551 (1963); Washington v. Oregon, 297
U.S. 517, 518 (1936); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40, 41 (1935); New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336, 341 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 662 (1931);
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 455 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 47
(1907).
26 Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972); New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995,
995 (1954); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 473, 476 (1931); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 517 (1906).
27 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
28 Id.
29 William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today-Has the CWA Been a Success?, 55 ALA.
L. REV. 527 (2004), is a timely description and analysis of the operation and effectiveness
of the CWA which also cites much of the pertinent literature. Also see the leading environmental law treatises: 2 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISEON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
5 3.01-3.05 (2004), and 1 WILLIAMH. RODGERS,JR. ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: AIR &
WATER$5 1.1-3.41 (1986).
30 The original water pollution control legislation, which passed on June 30, 1948, was
known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), Pub. L. No. 80-845,62 Stat.
1155 (1948) (codified prior to 1972 at 33 U.S.C. 55 1151-1165). Congress completely
amended this Act in 1972, creating the same basic form and content which exists today,
despite numerous subsequent amendments. It continued to be known as the FWPCA until
the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1577. Although
the 1977 amendments adopted "Clean Water Act" or "CWA" as the name of the amending
statute rather than the name of the underlying statute (see the Historical and Statutory
Notes following 33 U.S.C.A. 5 1251 (2000)), environmental practitioners quickly adopted
the far more appealing CWA nomenclature. The Supreme Court first adopted it in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def: Counsel (NRDC), 470 U.S. 116, 118 (1985).
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point sources and non-point sources. Pipes and other conveyances
carry point source pollution to surface water. Storm water runoff
carries non-point source pollution to surface water.31 The CWA
erects a sophisticated and effective regulatory system to control
and reduce pollution from point sources. The CWA32establishes
only the suggestion, not the requirement, of creating what amounts
to an ineffective state-run program for dealing with pollution from
non-point sources.33 Predictably, the Court's decisions have dealt
only with the point source program.
The prohibition against the addition of any pollutant to a navigable water from a point source that is without a permit or in violation of a permit is the basis of the CWA's regulatory program.34
The CWA establishes a permit program administered by the EPA
to control point-source discharges of pollutants35 and a separate
permit program administered by the Corps of Engineers to control
filling of wetlands.36 The EPA and the Corps of Engineers were
the original and remain the default permit issuing authorities for
their respective programs. However, a state may develop an
equivalent permit program and submit it to the EPA or the Corps
of Engineers for approval. Either entity must approve a state program if it meets federal standards, and thereafter the state, not the
federal agency, is the permit issuing a~thority.~'Most states oper-

31 While the point sourcelnon-point source distinction is clear in most cases, it is blurred
in others. For instance, courts have held that man-made piles of material placed so that
rain water runoff naturally forms channels into navigable waters are point sources in Sierra
Club v. Abston Construction Co., 620 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1980), and they are not point
sources in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351,1373 (4th Cir. 1976). Perhaps as
a result, courts have ruled that the EPA has considerable discretion to define point sources
by rule as indicated by NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
32 CWA 5 208, 33 U.S.C. 5 1288 (2000).
33 See Richard A. March et al., Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Section 208 Planning:
Legal and Institutional Issues, 1981-1982 AGRIC.
L. REV.324, 349; Lawrence P. Wilkins,
The Implementation of Water Pollution Control Measures - Section 208 of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, 15 LAND& WATERL. REV.479, 496 (1980).
3-1 CWA 5 301(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(a) (2000) (elaborated by CWA 5 502(12), 33 U.S.C.
5 1362(12) (2000)). To expedite issuance of permits, CWA 5 511(c), 33 U.S.C. 5 1361(c)
(2000), exempted the issuance of pollution control permits to existing sources from the
requirements of NEPA, thus solving the problem that caused the Refuse Act permit program to abort. See Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1971).
35 CWA Q 402, 33 U.S.C. 5 1342 (2000).
36 CWA 5 404, 33 U.S.C. 5 1344 (2000).
37 The Corps of Engineers, however, may only approve state programs for waters that
are not within the traditional federal jurisdiction for improvement and maintenance of
navigation. CWA Q 404(g), 33 U.S.C. 5 1344(g) (2000).
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ate approved pollution control programs today, but few operate
approved wetlands protection programs.38
Pollution control permits, whether issued by the EPA or a state
with an approved program, must require the permit holder to treat
its wastewater to levels reflecting the more stringent of either: 1)
the level established by a nationally applicable technology-based
standard for the particular industry promulgated by the EPA, or 2)
the level necessary to achieve water quality standards designated
for the receiving water, developed by states and the EPA.39 The
statute requires industrial point sources to meet two progressively
more stringent levels of technology-based standards over time, but
requires municipalities to meet only one level.40 If the EPA is the
permit issuing authority, a state in which the pollution discharge
occurs has the opportunity to certify conditions in the permit necessary to meet the requirements of the CWA and appropriate state
law.41 Those conditions must be included in the federal permit.
Permits also require the permit holder to self-monitor its effluent
for compliance with the permit's effluent limitations and to report
the results to the EPA.42 Those reports are public information and
effluent data is not entitled to confidential treatment.43
The CWA provides the EPA with information gathering and
as well as a full array of enforcement sancinspection a~thority;~
tions for discharges of pollutants without permits or in violation of
CWA § 402 permits, whether the EPA or a state is the permit issu~
citizens with authority to sue violators
ing a ~ t h o r i t y .It~ provides
if the United States or an individual State has not done so.46 The
citizen suit provision also authorizes citizens to sue the EPA for
38 Only five states lack approved § 402 permit programs, although thirteen states just
have partially approved programs. See Environmental Protection Agency State NPDES
Program Authority Website, http:llwww.epa.govlnpdeslimageslState~NPDES~ProgAuth:
pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2005). By contrast, only two states have approved 5 404 programs,
primarily because of the lack of funding and the exclusion from the coverage of state programs of traditionally defined navigable waters. See Environmental Protection Agency
Wetlands Website, http:/lwww.epa.gov/owow/wetlandslfacts/fact23.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2005).
39 CWA 5 301(b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(b) (2000).
40 Id.
41 CWA 5 401, 33 U.S.C. 0 1341 (2000).
42 40 C.F.R. $8 122.44.45 (2004).
43 CWA 5 308(b), 33 U.S.C.
1318(b) (2000).
44 CWA § 308(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1318(a) (2000).
45 CWA § 309,33 U.S.C. 8 1319 (2000). CWA 5 404(s), 33 U.S.C. 8 1344(s) (2000) (providing the Corps of Engineers with enforcement authority against violations of § 404
permits).
16 CWA 5 505, 33 U.S.C. 0 1365 (2000).
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failure to perform a mandatory duty under the statute. The 1972
legislation created a major program of federal construction grants
for local sewage treatment plants:' later morphing into a revolving
fund administered by states.48 Finally, the CWA incorporates freestanding programs for oil spill prevention and remediation and for
control of sewage from vessels.49
The Court's opinions deal with issues arising in all but two of
these major aspects of the CWA.50 Its decisions occur in judicial
review of final administrative actions by the EPA and the Corps of
Engineers (for example, the promulgation of rules, the issuance or
denial of permits, and the assessment of administrative penalties)
as well as for non-administrative actions such as civil and criminal
actions, citizen suits against the EPA for not performing mandatory
duties, citizen suits against violating members of the regulated public, and state certification of conditions to be placed in permits.

A.

The Scoreboard

The results of the Court's decisions may be labeled pro- or antienvironmental,5' depending on whether they restrict or expand the
CWA's jurisdictional or substantive provisions controlling water
pollution52 or its procedural provisions for implementing and
enforcing the pollution control program.53 It might be assumed
CWA 99 201-221, 33 U.S.C. 99 1281-1301 (2000).
CWA $5 601-607, 33 U.S.C. $9 1381-1387 (2000).
49 CWA 9 311, 33 U.S.C. 9 1321 (largely replaced by the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C.
98 2701-2753 (2000)).
50 The exceptions are CWA 9 308, 33 U.S.C. 8 1318 (2000) (giving EPA authority to
gather information, require the submission of information, and conduct inspections), and
CWA 9 312, 33 U.S.C. Q 1321 (2000) (regulating the discharge of sewage from vessels).
5 1 Lazarus was able to categorize most of the Court's over 240 environmental law decisions, including all of the decisions he considered under the CWA. See Lazarus, Thirty
Years, supra note 2, at 27-32.
52 In Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64,66
n.2 (1980), the Court's decision, upholding an EPA regulation allowing variances in pretreatment standards for toxic pollutants, restricts the prohibition in 9 402(1), 33 U.S.C.
9 1342(1), against variances from technology-based standards for toxic pollutants. The
decision could thus be considered anti-environmental.
53 In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 414-15, 427 (1987), the Court's decision that a
jury trial is required to determine liability for a civil penalty under CWA 8 309, 33 U.S.C.
9 1319, could make it more difficult to enforce the statute and may thus be considered antienvironmental. Some predicted Tull would discourage the government from seeking civil
penalties in such cases. See Mark Dyner, Tull v. United States: Jury Trial Required in Statutory Civil Penalty Actions, 1988 UTAHL. REV.435,449-50 (1988); Barbara L. Lah, Right to
Trial by Jury in an Action for Civil Penalties and Injunctive Relief under the Clean Water
47

48
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that sound decisions under a statute intended to restore and maintain water quality would be pro-environmental decisions, but the
CWA is not a one-dimensional statute blindly pursuing clean water
regardless of other values. For instance, in establishing technologybased standards for water pollution control, the statute considers
~ ~also considers the
the costs of pollution control t e ~ h n o l o g y .It
implementation of the pollution control program by a complex
partnership of federal and state governments to be a value in itself,
even if another arrangement might abate water pollution more effiMoreover, even if the CWA was a singleciently or effe~tively.~~
minded edict, it does not exist in isolation, but is embedded in the
totality of the American legal system, inevitably intersecting with
constitutional, statutory, and judicial measures promoting or protecting other social and legal values. In reconciling conflicts within
the CWA or between the CWA and other components of the legal
system, even a pro-environmental Court could not be expected to
render decisions with pro-environmental results in all cases.
In terms of raw numbers, the Court's decisions reach anti-environmental results in thirteen of twenty-three cases, or in 56% of
the cases.56 That is not much of an imbalance. On the other hand,
its pre-1980 decisions reached anti-environmental results in one of
eight cases, or in 12.5% of the cases, while its post-1980 decisions
reached anti-environmental results in eleven of fifteen cases or in
73% of the cases.57 On the face if it, that seems seriously out of
balance. The post-1980 decisions were also considerably more contentious than the earlier ones. While only two of the eight earlier
decisions had dissents, with never more than two dissenters, all but
three of the last fifteen decisions had dissents, six of them with
three or more dissenter^.^^
Act, 28 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 607,621 (1988); Charles Openchowski, Changing the Nature of
Federal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 17 ENVTL.L. REP. 10304, 10306-307 (1987).
54 See CWA 5 302(b), 33 U.S.C. 9 1312(b) (2000); CWA $5 304(b)(l)(B), (2)(B), (3), &
(4)(B)-(C), 33 U.S.C. $9 1314(b)(l)(B), (2)(B), (3), & (4)(B)-(C) (2000). The Court discussed the role of cost in developing the effluent guidelines in E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129-31 n.21 (1977).
55 The partnership and some of the strains in the partnership are described in EPA v.
California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976); International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,487-92 (1987); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S.
1 (1992); United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 611 (1992).
56 See infra Table B.
57 See infra Table B. The contrast is emphasized by the Court's generally pro-environmental decisions under earlier water pollution control legislation. See supra notes 21-22.
58 See infra Table B. While the greater dissention in the latter cases does not explain
their anti-environmental tilt, the fact that the pro-environmental dissents came overwhelmingly from two Justices-Justices Stevens (eight pro-environmental dissents) and Black-
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Before concluding that the Court's post-1980 decisions are hopelessly anti-environmental, it should be noted that three of its four
latest decisions have pro-environmental results. Moreover, the
anti-environmental effects of some of the other, later decisions are
Finally, many of the decisions with antiof minor ~ignificance.~~
environmental results do not reflect the Court consciously picking
the least pro-environmental among the possible interpretations of
the statute. Instead, they result from the Court reconciling the
CWA with the Constitution, other statutes, and cross-cutting judicial doctrines that have lives far beyond the CWA.60 Where such
cross-cutting issues were at play, the environmental position prevailed in three cases and lost in ten, prevailing in 23% of the cases.
Where cross-cutting issues were not at play, the environmental
position prevailed in six cases and lost in four, prevailing in 60% of
the cases.61
A more disturbing observation about the eleven post-1980 decisions with anti-environmental results is that seven of them were
citizen enforcement or private federal common law public nuisance
actions.(j2 The repeated anti-environmental rulings of the Court
against citizen suits and private actions raise the question of
whether the Court is unsympathetic with that aspect of open govmun (five pro-environmental dissents)-may
not bode well for pro-environmental
decisions under the CWA in the future.
59 For instance, while Chemical Manufactures Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 134 (1985),
upholds the EPA's authority t o grant variances from technology-based standards for toxic
pollutants, the EPA's record of granting only four variance requests in the first twelve
years of its administration of the CWA-noted by the Court in footnote twelve-suggests
that the availability of the variance will not result in a flood of variances for toxics.
60 Preemption of federal common law by federal statutes is addressed in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304 (1987); private rights of action were implied from federal statutes in
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 11, 14
(1981); equitable discretion in granting injunctions is discussed in Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318 (1982); preemption of state common law by federal statutes
appears in International Paper Co. v. Ouellene, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); right to trial by jury in
civil penalty cases is outlined in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987); sovereign
immunity is addressed in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992);
the American rule that all litigants pay their own attorney fees is expressed in City o f
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1992); the reach of Commerce Clause jurisdiction is discussed in Solid Waste Authority of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps o f
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001).
61 See infra Table B .
62 See infra Table B . Two of the decisions were judicial reviews of EPA actions and
deference to the implementing agency explains these two decisions. If the decisions have
anti-environmental results and the Court defers to agency action in an even-handed manner, their anti-environmental tilt originates with the EPA, not with the Court. Additionally, one decision was a government enforcement action and one was a CWA § 404 permit
denial by the Corps of Engineers.
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ernrnent. The question becomes more serious when the outcome
of these private suits is combined with the outcome of suits with
cross-cutting issues. Before 1980, in cases with a cross-cutting
issue, the anti-environmental position prevailed in two of four
cases, or in 50% of the cases. In the one case in which private
plaintiffs brought an action with a cross-cutting issue, the anti-environmental position prevailed. After 3.980, when there was a crosscutting issue, the anti-environmental position prevailed in eight
cases and lost in one, prevailing in 88% of the cases. When a private party brought such a case, the anti-environmental position
prevailed in seven out of eight cases, prevailing in 85% of the
cases. This suggests that the private nature of these suits influences
their outcome as much as the presence or absence of a cross-cutting issue, and that both are important factors. Those decisions are
worth examining with that question in
although it probably
cannot be answered conclusively by examining only decisions arising under the CWA.

B.

The Headcount

Richard Lazarus surveyed over 240 decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court under the environmental statutes, and he concluded that neither the Court nor the individual Justices appreciate
"environmental law as a distinct area of law."64 The fact that Justice White wrote more opinions in those cases than any of the other
Justices reinforces Lazarus7 conclusion, because Justice White's
opinions do not "suggest any distinct vision of the role of law in
While
~
Justice Kennedy voted with
environmental p r ~ t e c t i o n . " ~
the majority in virtually one hundred percent of the environmental
decisions, he never wrote an opinion. The anomaly between Kennedy's critical vote in environmental decisions and his apparent
lack of interest in the issues they raise further reinforced Lazarus7
c o n c l ~ s i o n .Finally,
~~
Lazarus found that while Justice Douglas
voted for the environmental position one hundred percent of the
time, only three other Justices voted for such positions more than
half the time.67 Because Douglas left the Court in 1974, his perfect
voting record did not have much of an impact on the course of
modern environmental law. The lack of a more long-lived voice
63
@

65

66
67

This examination is made in Part 111.
Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra note 2, at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6-7.
Brennan, 58.5%; Marshall, 61.3%; and Stevens, 50.6%. Id. at 11.
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for the environment on the Court could go a long way in accounting for Lazarus' conclusions.
Conducting the headcount with CWA decisions confirms the
bulk of Lazarus' observations, although it raises interesting differences. Again, Justice White wrote more decisions in CWA cases
than any other Justice, but those decisions lack an overarching
environmental view.68 Yet his dissent in U.S. Department of
Energy v. Ohio (DOE)69speaks eloquently of the massive failure
of federal facilities to shoulder their environmental responsibilities
and of the Court depriving citizens and states of a "powerful
weapon in combating federal agencies that.persist in despoiling the
environment" by taking an unduly narrow reading of the congressional waiver of sovereign immunity in CWA 9 313.70 Again, Justice Kennedy is always in the majority on CWA decisions and has
never written an opinion.'l But Justice Douglas is no longer the
only Justice with a perfect pro-environment record; he is joined by
~ ~ whilk Lazarus could identify
Justices Breyer and G i n ~ b e r g .And
only three Justices voting for pro-environmental decisions fifty percent of the time or more, in CWA decisions, eight Justices have
done so.73
Lazarus ended his survey with cautious optimism, noting that the
Court had just granted a writ of certiorari filed by environmental
plaintiffs in what would become Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Znc. l laid la^).^^ He noted that the
68 Justice White wrote six, Justice Rehnquist three, and Stevens, Marshall, and Powell
each wrote two. See infra Table B.
69 503 U.S. 607, 629 (1992).
70 33 U.S.C 0 1323 (2000).
71 Justice Kennedy did author a one paragraph concurrence in Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 197 (2000), raising the disturbing issue of whether the authorization of citizens to seek civil penalties for violations of
the CWA under 8 505,33 U.S.C. 8 1365, usurps the constitutional prerogative of the executive branch, thus violating separation of powers principles. This appears to be a non-issue,
because separation of powers conflicts arise where one branch of government invades the
constitutional prerogative of another branch, e.g., Congress invading the President's prerogative in legislation asserting the right to veto otherwise valid presidential action. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983). Citizen suits do
not represent congressional usurpation of executive power, for they retain no power in
Congress and the executive branch may prevent a citizen suit by taking an enforcement
action.
72 See infra Table B.
73 See infra Table B (showing the following pro-environmental records for Supreme
Court justices: Brennan, 50%; Burger, 56%; Blackmun, 68%; Kennedy, 59%; Marshall,
63%; Souter, 59%; Stevens, 81; and White, 58%).
74 Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra note 2, at 21. The Court granted certiorari in Laidlaw at
525 U.S. 1176 (1999), and decided the case at 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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Court had not granted a writ of certiorari at the exclusive request
of an environmental plaintiff since 1972 and that there was no reason for it to do so unless it desired to overturn the Fourth Circuit's
decision against the environmental plaintiffs. The Court's decision
in the case was better than he could have hoped, as he subsequently e ~ p l a i n e d . ~ ~
The good news does not stop with Laidlaw. Three of the Court's
last four CWA decisions have favored the pro-environmental positions. Justice O'Connor authored two of these decisions.76 She has
also voted for the pro-environmental position in six of the thirteen
decisions (46%) in which she participated. Two of her six pro-environmental votes were in dissent, and in two of the remaining four
she wrote the majority opinion. Moreover, her voting position
migrated over the years. Before City of Burlington v. Dague
( D a g ~ e )her
, ~ ~votes were for pro-environmental positions in only
two out of eight decisions or 25% of the time; since Dague, her
votes have been for pro-environmental positions in four out of five
decisions or 80% of the time. While some of these later votes may
be explained by other preferences,'* in the aggregate they will
make environmentalists regret her departure from the Court. Nevertheless, the history of Justice O'Connor's evolution in CWA decisions suggests that some Justices can and do become progressively
more pro-environmental during their terms on the Court.

IV. QUALITATIVE
CONCLUSIONS
A. Does the Court Have a CWA Jurisprudence?
The Court has decided twenty-three cases under the CWA.
Even though the Court does not always have a firm grasp on the
75 See Lazarus, Three Years Later, supra note 2, at 658-59 (noting that Laidlaw "was a
significant victory for the environmental community," reversing a series of decisions that
had progressively narrowed standing for environmental plaintiffs).
76 In the first of those decisions, PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 703, 709-10 (1994), however, the environmental position
coincided with the states' rights position. This lent a note of caution to hopes that Justice
O'Connor was becoming an environmental convert. In the second, South Flordia Water
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 531 U.S. 95 (2003), the Court rejected
the anti-environmental position on one issue and hinted that it would reject an anti-environmental argument on a second, but did not reach it, instead remanding it for consideration by the lower courts in light of the facts already found by the lower courts. The dissent
suggested the Court easily could have rejected the second argument without remanding it.
Id. at 112.
77 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
78 Her position in PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 722-23, for instance, could reflect a states'
rights bias.
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statute, it might be expected to have developed a consistent jurisprudence in the course of those decisions. One indication of the
extent to which it has developed a CWA jurisprudence is the frequency with which its CWA opinions cite its earlier CWA opinions.
Surprisingly, nine of the opinions do not cite even one other CWA
opinion and ten of the opinions are not cited by any subsequent
CWA opinion.79 On average, a CWA opinion cites fewer than two
other CWA opinions.s0 This lack of interest in previous opinions
does not stem from their lack of relevance to the issues at hand.
Tull v. United States ( T ~ l l ) did
~ l not cite United States v. Ward
(Ward),82 although both considered the punitive nature of the
CWA's civil penalties. DOEs3 did not cite EPA v. California ex rel.
State Water Resource Control Board (California Board),84although
both considered the extent of the CWA's waiver of sovereign
immunity. Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle (Crown S i r n p s ~ n ) ~ ~
did not cite E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train (E.I. du
P ~ n t ) although
,~~
both interpreted CWA 9 509(b), the provision
governing judicial review of EPA final agency actions in courts of
appeals. South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians ( M i c c o s ~ k e edid
) ~ ~not cite United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside bay vie^)^^ or Solid Waste
Agency of North Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (SWANCC),s9although all three interpreted "navigable
waters."
Although the Supreme Court may have developed a rudimentary "worldview" of the CWA, the Court can forget that worldview
at the drop of a hat when it gets in the way of a decision the Court
seems determined to make.90 With the complexity of the statute
79 See infra Table B. These numbers exclude the earliest C W A opinion from the decisions citing no other CWA opinion and the latest C W A opinion from the decisions not
cited by other decisions.
80 See infra Table B.
81 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
82 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
83 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
@ 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
85 445 U.S. 193 (1980).
86 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
87 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
474 U.S. 121 (1985).
89 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
90 In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314 (1982), for instance, the Court
quipped that "[tlhe integrity of the Nation's waters . . . not the permit process" is the
purpose of the CWA,while rejecting automatic injunctions against discharging pollutants
into navigable waters from point sources without a permit. But in International Paper Co.
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being interpreted, the Court's deference to the EPA's interpretation could be expected to be considerable and consistent. Indeed,
the Court's developing jurisprudence of deference is evident in its
CWA decision^.^' But again, the Court can forget about deference
entirely when it gets in the way of a decision the Court seems
determined to make.92
Despite the opportunity to develop a consistent view of the
CWA in the course of its twenty-three opinions, the Court has not
done so. Its decisions are more driven by the presence or absence
v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-96 (1987), the Court found the integrity and administerability of the permit program of sufficient importance that it pre-empted the common law
of nuisance for water pollution in states downstream from pollution sources.
91 The first two decisions giving judicial review to EPA regulations interpreting the
CWA did not mention judicial deference to the EPA's interpretation. Train v. Colo. Pub.
Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976) (sustaining the EPA's interpretation); Train v.
City of N.Y., 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (rejecting the EPA's interpretation). In the third such
opinion, the Court looked first at the wording, structure, and legislative history of the
CWA regarding the interpretation at issue. E.I. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 127-30. The Court
went on to note that sections 101(d), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(d) & 501(a), 33 U.S.C. 9 1361(a),
charged the EPA with administering the CWA and promulgating regulations to implement
it. E.I. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 132. Only then did the Court find the EPA's interpretation to
be "'sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency.'" Id. at 135 (quoting Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60,87 (1975)).
Not content with that justification, it also noted that the overwhelming majority of decisions of the courts of appeals and the "thorough, scholarly opinions written by some of our
finest judges" supported the EPA's position. Id. at 135. The next such decision, Costle v.
Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198 (1980), considered the EPA's procedural rules for
permit issuance. The Court held that courts should accord administrative agencies deference with regard to the details of their procedures as long as they met the minimum
requirements of the Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the authorizing
statutes. Id. at 212-215. In EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 73-79
(1989), the Court returned to the methodology of E.I. du Pont by thoroughly reviewing the
wording, structure, and history of the statute. Only then did it hold that deference should
be given to the EPA's "reasonable construction" of the CWA and found that the EPA's
construction was reasonable. National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 83-84. The Court's last
judicial review of the EPA's regulations, in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC, 470
U.S. 116 (1985), is the first time it used the now standard doctrine of Chevron, U.S.A.,Inc.
v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that if the statute is ambiguous, courts
should defer to the interpretation of the agency designated by Congress to administer the
statute, if that interpretation is reasonable).
In Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131-35, the Court performed a Chevron analysis of the
Corps of Engineers' interpretation of "navigable waters" in the Corps of Engineers's regulations, upholding them. In SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168, the Court rejected another interpretation of "navigable waters" in the Corps of Engineers' regulations, giving no deference
because the interpretation was of recent vintage and contrary to the Corps of Engineers'
earlier interpretations.
92 In Illinois v. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304,332 (1981), for instance, the Court held that the
CWA pre-empted the federal common law of nuisance, without mentioning that the government filed an amicus brief arguing that the federal common law of nuisance survived
the CWA. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Illinois v. Milwaukee, 451 U.S.
304 (1981) (NO. 79-408), 1980 WL 339512.
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of a cross-cutting legal issue or by the nature of the parties before it
than by its understanding of the statute and its purpose. It often
fails to use or cite previous decisions that support its position or
entirely disregards previous decisions that do not support its position. This reinforces Professor Lazarus' conclusion that the Court
has no appreciation of "environmental law as a distinct area of the
law" or "vision of the role of law in environmental p r ~ t e c t i o n . " ~ ~

B. Does the Court Understand the Clean Water Act?
With some ninety sections and over four hundred subsections,
the CWA is a long and complex statute, covering some one hundred eighty pages in the United States Code.94 Understanding the
statute, of course, does not require an intimate knowledge of all of
its sections. California Board cited seventeen different sections in
an attempt to sketch a comprehensive picture of the statute.95 The
Court frequently cited California Board in subsequent CWA decisions as a shorthand guide to the statute.96 During the course of its
twenty-three CWA decisions, the Court has decided issues under
fifteen of the sections97and cited thirty-two sections, covering the
most important sections in the statute. But the Court cited only
seven sections in the average decision, not a very comprehensive
slice of the statute. The Court's often meager examination of only
the CWA sections relevant to the cases before it suggests that it
may have a less than total understanding of the statute.
Compounding this, sixteen, or two-thirds of the Court's twentythree CWA decisions, contain an analytical mistake or omission
regarding the statute. In some, the Court missed a provision that
~ ~others, it failed
would have helped its argument or c o n c l ~ s i o n .In
Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra note 2, at 3, 5.
In the 2000 version of the United States Code the CWA covered pages 356-533.
95 See infra Table B.
96 Indeed, the Court cited EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board,
426 U.S. 200 (1976), in nine of its twenty subsequent CWA decisions, more than it cited
any other CWA decision in subsequent CWA opinions. See infra Table B.
97 See in*
Table B.
98 In Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 4 (1976), environmental plaintiffs filed a CWA 505 citizen suit in district court, seeking judicial review of
EPA regulations exempting nuclear waste regulated under the Atomic Energy Act, 42
U.S.C. $5 2011-2281, from the definition of "pollutant" under CWA 502(6), 33 U.S.C.
5 1362(6). This exclusion effectively removed such nuclear waste from regulation by
CWA's point source permit program. The Court upheld the EPA's action in an opinion
reconciling the two statutes, Colorado Public Interest, 426 U.S. at 15-17. However, it could
have accomplished the same end result more easily on jurisdictional grounds. CWA
5 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(2), authorizes mandamus actions in district courts against
the EPA when it has not taken actions required of it by the CWA. But once the EPA has
93
94

s
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to address a provision contrary to its argument or conclusion.
While the unaddressed provisions were not necessarily fatal to the

taken the actions, section 505 does not confer jurisdiction for judicial review in district
courts or elsewhere. Colorado Public Interest, 426 U.S. at 15-17. CWA 8 509(b), 33 U.S.C.
1369(b), authorizes judicial review of specified EPA actions in the courts of appeals, but
EPA regulations of the type at issue are not among the listed actions. The Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, however, creates a cause of action for judicial review of
such regulations, with federal question jurisdiction in the district courts under 28 U.S.C.
1331. As a result, in Colorado Public Interest, plaintiffs commenced their actions in the
right court, but under the wrong claim of jurisdiction, and could have been dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds. However, there are important differences between citizen suit jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. The former, for instance, provides attorney fee
awards for successful plaintiffs, whereas the latter does not.
In California Board, 426 U.S. at 213-14 (1976), states challenged the EPA's disapproval
of state permit programs insofar as they applied to polluting federal facilities. Among
other things, the states argued they could not effectively include their requirements in
water pollution permits for federally owned water pollution sources unless states rather
than the EPA issued permits t o them. The Court could have avoided its prolonged
response to this argument simply by noting that CWA 401,33 U.S.C. 1341, authorized
the states to require the EPA to include such state requirements in permits that it issued.
In Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193, 196-97 (1980), the Court held that
CWA 509(b), 33 U.S.C. 1369(b), granted authority to the courts of appeals for judicial
review of EPA action vetoing the issuance, by a state with an EPA approved permit program, of a CWA § 402 permit although § 509(b) does not mention such authority. The
Court did so because 509(b) granted the courts of appeals jurisdiction for judicial review
of EPA denial of a permit. Crown Simpson, 445 U.S. at 196-97. The effects of the EPA
denying a permit and vetoing a state issued permit are the same, and it is irrational to have
the form of judicial review of EPA action regarding a permit differ depending on whether
the EPA or a state is the permit issuer. Id. The Court found it particularly anomalous that
such a bifurcation would result in slower review of the EPA's action with regard t o state
issued permits than of the EPA's actions on its own permits. Id. The statutory undesirability of that anomaly is underscored by CWA § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(b), which states a
congressional policy preference for state administration of the permit program. Curiously,
the Court did not mention 101(b).
In United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 257-60 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting), Justice
Stevens argued in dissent that the criminal sanction for failing to report oil spills in
3 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(5), violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against
self-incrimination. The majority could easily have responded to this argument, and Justice
Stevens might not have made it, had they recognized the requirement from CWA
§ 311(b)(5) was to "immediately" notify and that its purpose was to enable the government
t o effectively contain and control oil spills. One factor in the effectiveness of spill response
is how quickly the spill is responded to and one factor governing the speed of spill response
is the time that passes before the government learns of the spill. Justice Stevens himself
admitted that if the purpose of the requirement was "to assist the Government in its
cleanup responsibilities," it was a permissible requirement. Ward, 448 U.S. at 259.
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Court's arguments99or its decisions,100its failure to address them
99 In Ward, 448 U.S. at 249-50, the Court acknowledged that one factor in determining
whether the penalty for an oil spill under CWA 5 311(b)(6), 33 U.S.C. 9 1321(b)(6), is
criminal or civil is whether oil spills are already criminal acts. It noted they were already
criminal acts under the Refuse Act of 1899,33 U.S.C. 8 407. Ward, 448 U.S. at 250. While
the Court discounted this factor, it failed to note that a negligent or knowing spill is also a
criminal act under CWA 5 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) and 9 309(c), 33 U.S.C. 9 1319(c).
The Court dealt with this factor without recognizing its full relevance by citing Helvering v.
Mitchell, which stated that "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in
respect to the same act or omission." Ward, 448 U.S. at 250 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391,399 (1938)). The government brief did not mention that the spill might have
been a criminal act under 9 309(c) of the CWA. See Brief for the United States, United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (No. 79-394), 1980 WL 339616.
100 In Middlesex County Sewerage Commission v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 22 (1981), the Court held that the CWA was so comprehensive that "the federal
common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more
comprehensive scope of the" (emphasis added) CWA. While this conclusion may be warranted for claims arising from point source pollution, it is not warranted for claims arising
from non-point source pollution as implied by the Court's "entirely pre-empted" statement.
Id. (emphasis added); See discussion infra pp. 143-146 and accompanying notes 106-121.
Worse, the Court concluded that "the federal common law of nuisance has been fully preempted in the area of ocean pollution" by the CWA, despite the CWA's lack of jurisdiction
over ocean pollution. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). Finally, the Court
rejected a private cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 because the CWA
and the Marine Protection, Resources and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C.59 1401-1445 (1976),
already authorized more limited private enforcement of statutory violations (without damages) in their respective citizen suit provisions. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 2021. The
Court, however, entirely ignored the savings provision in CWA 5 505(e), 33 U.S.C.
9 1365(e), stating that "[nlothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person . . .
may have under any statute . . . ." Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 2021.
In Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607,618 (1992), the Court notes that 9 311,33
U.S.C. § 1321, and 5 312, 33 U.S.C. Q 1322, of the CWA contain their own definitions of
"person," which both include the United States. In contrast the general definition of "person" in § 502(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5), does not include the United States. The Court offers
this in support of its argument that when 9 505(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a), authorizes the
assessment of civil penalties under 9 309(d), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d), against violators of the
CWA, the inclusion of the United States among the "persons" who may be sued under
9 505(a) does not carry over to the "persons" against whom civil penalties may be assessed
under 9 309(d). See DOE, 503 U.S. at 619. The Court's argument is seriously undercut,
however, by the fact that both 5 311 and 5 312 of the CWA are freestanding provisions for
oil spills and marine sanitation devices which have their own definitional, standard setting,
and enforcement authorities. In addition, they were enacted separately from and prior to
the remainder of the CWA, they are not the basis for permit conditions under 5 402, and
they are not enforceable under 5 309. Section 309 and section 505, on the other hand, are
part of the woof and warp of the CWA's point source control program and in this instance
are directly interrelated. That may not dispose of the Court's argument, but it certainly
weakens the argument.
In SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159,164-65 (2001), a local waste disposal agency challenged the
Corps of Engineers' determination that isolated ponds, not alleged-to be connected or
adjacent to navigable waters, were navigable because of their use "as habitat b y . . . migratory birds which cross state lines," under the so-called "migratory bird rule." The local
agency argued isolated wetlands were not within the statutory definition of navigable
waters, and, if they were, the assertion of jurisdiction exceeded Congress' authority to reg-
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casts doubt on the Court's grasp of the statute. In some decisions,
the Court did not fully understand the very provisions or concepts
it was dealing with,lOlparticularly the significance of the distinction
ulate under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 165-66. A sharply divided
Court held that isolated wetlands were not "navigable waters" as used in CWA 5 404, thus
avoiding the constitutional issue. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. The Court noted that Congress had unequivocally acquiesced in 1977 to the Corps of Engineers' amendment of its
regulation to include wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, while Congress did not do so
with the Corps of Engineers' subsequent amendment, the migratory bird rule. Id. at 167,
169-70. The dissent found this logic disingenuous because the unequivocal acquiescence
by Congress in 1977 was to the Corps of Engineers' interpretation that included both adjacent and isolated wetlands. Id. at 184-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Corps of Engineers'
interim regulations in 1975 covered "non-navigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse
could affect interstate commerce" and "wetlands that are not contiguous or adjacent to
navigable waters." 40 Fed. Reg. 31,322, 31,325-26 (July 25, 1975). It promulgated its final
regulation in 1977, including "isolated lakes and wetlands." 42 Fed. Reg. 37,127 (July 19,
1977). The migratory bird rule appears merely to put a gloss on this.
101 The Court in SWANCC admitted it had noted earlier in Riverside Bayview that "navigable" is of "limited import," for Congress intended to "regulate at least some waters that
would not be deemed 'navigable' under the traditional understanding of that term."
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167 (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133). The Court could
not agree that Congress intended to read "navigable" out of the CWA. Id. at 172. It did so
by focusing almost entirely on 9 404, rather than on the definition of "navigable water" in
5 502(7) as the "waters of the United States." SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172. The legislative
history of that definition, including its abandonment of any notion of traditional navigability, suggests the Court was wrong in its statutory interpretation and should have addressed
the constitutional issue. Prof. Lazarus suggests the Court might well have found isolated
wetlands beyond the reach of Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Lazarus, Three Years, supra
note 2, at 660-64.
See Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (examining whether CWA 5 309(1),
which forbid the EPA t o "modify" any requirement of 5 301 or § 307(b) for toxic pollutants, applies to "fundamentally different factor" (FDF) variances authorized by 5 301(n)).
The Court, deferring t o the EPA's interpretation, held that it did not. Chemical Manufacturers, 470 U.S. at 134. To do so, the Court first had to find that the term "modify" was
ambiguous. To demonstrate that "modify" was ambiguous, the Court noted that
5 307(a)(1) required revision of pretreatment standards from time to time to keep up with
developing technology. Chemical Manufacturers, 470 U.S. at 125-26. This argument may
have had some force if 5 307(b)(l) used the verb "modify" instead of "revise," but it did
not. Why 5 307(b)(l) casts doubt on the meaning of "modify" in 5 301 is anyone's guess.
Whatever its merits, the Court appears t o have taken the argument from the government's
brief. Brief for the U.S. EPA at 14-18, Chemical Manufacturers, 470 U.S. 116 (Nos. 831013, 83-1373), 1984 WL 566007.
The Court also noted that both parties agreed the EPA could promulgate a best available technology (BAT) effluent guideline for a single plant subcategory of an industry on
the same basis that it could grant a F D F variance from a BAT effluent guideline. Chemical
Manufacturers, 470 U.S. at 131. That being the case, the Court saw no difference between
the two, other than a meaningless procedural formality. The procedural difference, however, is significant. The EPA's promulgation of a BAT effluent guideline is done through a
notice and comment rulemaking, which may be challenged in a court of appeals and governs any like source. The EPA'S issuance of a permit is an adjudicatory process, is initially
appealed administratively, and ultimately may be appealed to the court of appeals in the
circuit where the plant is located. To get an F D F variance, the applicant must prove that
its facility is very different in some respect from one of the factors the EPA studied in other
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between point sources and non-point sources,lo2water quality standards,lo3and the nature of state certification under CWA 9 401.1°4
Finally, some of the Court's decisions are littered with errors and
omissions.lo5
1. The Point/Non-Point Source Distinction
The CWA's overarching objective "is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."Io6 The pollution load in the nation's waters is from both
point sources and non-point sources, sometimes overwhelmingly
from non-point sources.lo7 The statute created sophisticated and
effective permit, surveillance, and enforcement systems to reduce
point source pollution to a minimal level. However, it created no
such program to deal with non-point source pollution. It did establish a fund for grants to planning agencies to develop regional pollution control programs, including programs to deal with non-point
sources,108but that funding has long since ceased. In any event,
none of the non-point source controls developed as a result of the
program were federally enforceable. Thus, the CWA is not
designed to reach its ambitious goal, but only to get part of the way
there. Probably because the Court has never seen a non-point
source case, it has never indicated an awareness of the significance
of the point source verses non-point source distinction. and
implications.
Beginning with the Court's second CWA decision, Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group ("Colorado PIRG"),109 and
continuing with California Board, the Court viewed the CWA as
regulating pollution from point sources, with a goal of eliminating
facilities as the basis for its national guideline. In granting the variance, the EPA is really
finding that the guideline does not apply to the facility and that the EPA must develop a
technology-based standard for the facility on a one-time basis under CWA 9 402(a), 33
U.S.C. 1342(a). This is not really modifying the effluent guideline, it is determining that
the general standard is inapplicable. Brief for the U.S. EPA at 11, Chemical Manufacturers, 470 U.S. 116,470 U.S. 116 (1985) (Nos. 83-1013,83-1373), 1984 WL 566007. The Court
could have reached the same result more consistently with the CWA had it understood the
nature of an FDF variance.
102 See discussion infra pp. 143-146 and accompanying notes 106-121.
103 See discussion infra pp. 146-151 and accompanying notes 122-151.
104 See discussion infra pp. 151-155 and accompanying notes 153-166.
105 See discussion infra pp. 155-167 and accompanying notes 167-232.
CWA 8 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 9 1251(a) (2000).
107 Andreen, supra note 29, at 563-564; THE COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY,
! hANNUAL
~
REPORT,
pp. 118-19 (1978).
108 CWA 208, 33 U.S.C. 8 1288 (2000). See literature cited infra note 33.
' 0 9 426 U.S. 1, 7 (1976).
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the discharge of pollutants by 1985."O Later, in Costle v. Pacific
Legal Foundation (PLF),lll the Court again recited the CWA's
goal of eliminating the discharge of pollutants by 1985 and noted
that the prohibition against adding pollutants to navigable waters
from point sources without a permit in 9 301(a) was "one means of
reaching that goal."l12 In neither decision did the Court note that
the 1985 goal pertains only to point source discharges of pollution
or that Congress created the 1985 goal as one means of achieving
the overarching CWA objective of restoring and maintaining the
integrity of the nation's waters. Both decisions treat the 1985 goal
as the only CWA objective. Both decisions appear unaware that
eliminating discharges by point sources could only partly achieve
clean water and that even the zero discharge goal is purely aspirational; the CWA contains no requirement that point source discharges of pollutants cease by 1985. Indeed, the statute allows
industrial dischargers until 1989 to achieve the second level of pollution control.l13 Although the statute requires the EPA to identify
control measures available to eliminate the discharge of pollutants,'14 it does not require the EPA to adopt such measures as
technology-based standards and does not require industry to
achieve them.l15 Moreover, 9 301(a), and the permit program it
engenders, is the only means the CWA provides to reach its overarching objective or any of its water purity goals.
Because Congress's failure to deal with non-point sources is primarily of policy significance and has little impact on the point
110 426 U.S. 200,203 (1976) (citing CWA J 101(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(l) which notes
that the goal of the CWA is to eliminate "the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters . . . by 1985"). Because CWA J 502(12), 33 U.S.C. J 1362(12), defines the phrases
"discharge of a pollutant" and "discharge of pollutants" to mean "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source," (emphasis added) the goal speaks
only of discharges from point sources.
111 445 U.S. 198 (1980).
112 Id. at 202.
113 CWA J 301(b), 33 U.S.C. J 1311(b)(E) (2000). While the 1972 version of the statute
required industrial sources to achieve BAT by 1983, Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, J 301(b), 86 Stat. 816, Congress in 1987 extended the BAT
compliance date to 1989, Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 29-30,
well after the 1985 goal for zero discharge.
114 CWA 5 304(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1314(b)(3) (2000).
11s The statute requires the EPA to develop technology-based standards reflecting the
best available technology (BAT), 9 304(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. J 1314(b)(2) (2000), and the best
conventional control technology (BCT), 5 304(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. J 1314(b)(4) (2000). In
addition, CWA 9 301(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. 9 1311(b)(2) (2000), requires industrial dischargers
to meet the 5 304(b)(2) and (4) levels of technology, but does not mention the measures
for eliminating discharges of pollutants from 5 304(b)(3).
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source regulatory program and the legal issues it raises,l16 the
Court's failure to grasp the significance of the pointlnon-point
source distinction was of no consequence in California Board or
PLF. But the Court's decisions in Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee 11)"' and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n (Sea Clarnmer~)''~may have obliterated the distinction without the Court being aware of it. Because the Court
believed that the CWA comprehensively addressed water pollution, it concluded in Milwaukee I1 that the CWA displaced the federal common law of nuisance. The Court qualified that conclusion
as pertaining "at least so far as concerns the claims of respondents,"'lg which were point source ~ 1 a i m s . lThis
~ ~ would have left
the door open for the Court to conclude in an appropriate case that
the CWA did not displace the federal common law of nuisance for
non-point source pollution. Apparently unaware of the implications of the distinction, the Court in Sea Clammers re-characterized
its decision in Milwaukee II as holding that: "the federal common
law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted
by the more comprehensive scope of the [CWA]."12' HOWcan the
116 Congress's failure to legislate on this issue does have some impact. When both point
and non-point sources contribute to a water body not achieving a water quality criterion,
the permit-issuing agency must develop effluent limitations for the point source permits to
achieve the criterion. The result is the statute places the burden of achieving water quality
standards solely on point sources. Further, it means that when non-point source pollution
must be reduced to achieve water quality standards, water quality standards will not be
achieved.
117 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
118 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
" 9 Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. at 317.
120 Id. at 319-20.
121 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added). Curiously, the Court also held that
damage claims based on the pollution-induced collapse of ocean fisheries were "fully preempted [by the CWA] in the area of ocean pollution." Id. at 11. The jurisdiction of the
CWA, however, extends to the territorial seas, not to the ocean. CWA 5 502(7)-(8), 33
U.S.C. 5 1362(7)-(8). Not acknowledging this, the Court nevertheless commented that if
ocean waters are not within the jurisdiction of the CWA, they are covered by the Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. 55 1401-1445
(1976). Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 22. The Court stated "we see no cause for different
treatment for the pre-emption question[;] . . . [tlhe regulatory scheme of the MPRSA is no
less comprehensive, with respect to ocean pollution, than are other analogous provisions"
of the CWA. Id. A quick glance comparing the CWA and MPRSA suggests this is not so.
MPRSA's twenty-two sections, seventy-seven subsections, and twenty-three pages in the
U.S. Code (pp. 533-56 in the 2000 edition), are dwarfed by the CWA's ninety sections,
over four-hundred subsections, and one-hundred-eighty pages in the U.S. Code (pp.
356-533 in the 2000 edition). MPRSA regulates only waste sent from the United States to
be dumped at sea and U.S. flagships (excluding war ships) dumping waste at sea. 33 U.S.C.
8 1401 (2000). It does not address pollution from the operation of vessels. pollution
originating from land, pollution originating from non-U.S. flag ships unless they are dump-
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CWA pre-empt the federal common law of nuisance for non-point
source pollution, when the CWA does not regulate non-point
source pollution? While this misperception did not affect the outcome of these two decisions concerning point source pollution, it
could negatively affect subsequent cases concerning non-point
source pollution.

2. Water Quality Standards
The Court also has a shaky understanding of water quality standards. It began well enough in California Board, recognizing that
the water quality strategy of earlier legislation had failed because it
focused "on tolerable effects rather than preventable causes . . .
awkwardly shared federal and state responsibility . . . and . . . cumbrous enforcement procedures."122 However, the decision did not
deal with water quality standards and did not suggest that the
Court actually knew what water quality standards are and how
they are implemented. Later, in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette ( O ~ e l l e t t e the
) ~ ~Court
~
confused water quality standards and
technology-based standards. It observed that the EPA issues permits "according to established effluent standards [referring to what
this article describes as technology-based standards] and water
quality standards, that in turn are based upon available technol~ g y , " and
' ~ ~that if a state imposed its own standards "it also must
consider the technological feasibility of more stringent controls. ,7125
Water quality standards are not based on available technology and
the CWA does not require states to consider technological feasibility in establishing their standards.126 The only authority the Court
cites for these startling propositions is CWA § 302, 33 U.S.C.
3 1312, which simply does not support them.127
ing waste originating in the United States, or pollution from structures other than vessels,
such as oil platforms.
122 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976).
123 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
124 Id. at 494.
125 Id. at 495.
126 The water quality standards section, CWA 5 303, 33 U.S.C. 5 1313 (2000), does not
even hint that water quality standards should look to the availability or feasibility of technology, nor does § 304(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2000), which directs the EPA to issue
guidelines for states on how t o develop water quality standards, particularly water quality
criteria.
127 CWA 5 302,33 U.S.C. § 1312 (2000), authorizes the EPA to issue permits with effluent limitations sufficient to achieve BAT and B C I technology-based requirements, but
without more stringent effluent limitations to achieve water quality standards if the costs of
going beyond BAT or BCT greatly outweigh the benefits. It can d o so only with the concurrence of the state. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(A). It cannot do so for more than one period
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When the Court did deal with water quality standards, in Arkansas v. Oklahoma ( O k l a h ~ m a ) it
, ~ described
~~
them more accurately, but fumbled when it came to the details. Its biggest mistake
was to indicate that the "primary means for enforcing [water quality standards] is the NPDES [permit program], enacted in 1972."lZ9
This wording is unfortunate. Water quality standards are developed under CWA sections 303 and 304130 to form the basis of effluent limitations in permits. The CWA enforcement section is
directed at violations of permits, not at violations of water quality
standards.131 Thus permits may achieve water quality standards by
incorporating effluent limitations calculated to do so, but permits
do not enforce water quality standards. Stating that water quality
standards are enforceable suggests that enforcers may sue dischargers for violating water quality standards, regardless of
whether the discharges violate effluent limitations in permits. This
suggestion is reinforced by the Court's statement that permits are
the primary means of enforcing water quality standards-indicating that there are other means of enforcing them.132 Finally, the
Court continues that 9 303(d) "allocate[s] the burden of reducing
undesirable discharges between existing sources and new
sources."133 But 5 303(d) does not mention allocating the pollution
reduction needed to meet water quality standards among new and
existing ~ 0 u r c e s . lThe
~ ~ Court's misstatement of 5 303(d) supports
of five years with regard to toxic pollutants. 33 U.S.C. 1312(b)(2)(A). The section cited
by the Court contains no limitation on state authority to require more stringent requirements. Furthermore, CWA 9 401, 33 U.S.C. $9 1341, and § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, reserve
the authority of states to require more stringent standards, with no condition that they be
technologically feasible.
128 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
129 Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
130 33 U.S.C. $5 1313-1314.
131 CWA 5 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C.
1319(a)(l) (2000), and § 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C.
5 1319(a)(3) (2000), authorize the EPA enforcement against violations of listed statutory
sections (not including the water quality standards sections, CWA $9 303-304, 33 U.S.C.
$0 1313-1314 (2000)) and permit conditions.
132 Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 101.
133 Id. at 108.
134 CWA 5 303(d)(l)-(3), 33 U.S.C.
1313(d)(l)-(3) (2000), only require developing
the total maximum daily load of pollutants a water-body can carry without exceeding water
quality standards; they do not require allocating the reduction of any excess to particular
pollution sources. CWA 303(d)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4) (2000), however, provides that
if a water-body does not meet water quality standards, a "waste load allocation established
under this section" may not be revised unless one of two conditions is met. It is unlikely
that an allocation would have been established for a source that did not exist when the
allocation was made, making it unlikely that allocations would have been made between
existing and new sources. However, the statutes suggest the opposite; CWA § 303(e), 33
U.S.C. §$ 1313(e) (2000), and § 304(1), 33 U.S.C. 1314(1) (2000), address the development
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the Court's conclusion that the CWA allows new sources to discharge into waters not meeting water quality standards.13' But it
could have reached the same result without the m i ~ s t a t e r n e n t . ~ ~ ~
In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of
Ecology (PUD No. 1)13' the Court again started down the right
path. It noted that 5 303, 33 U.S.C. 9 1313, requires states, with
EPA approval, to "institute comprehensive water quality stand a r d ~ . " And
' ~ ~ it noted, no less than three times, that under CWA
5 303(c)(2)(A) water quality standards consist of designated uses
for a water body and criteria to support those uses.139 But it then
repeats and compounds its earlier misstatement by saying "[sltates
are responsible for enforcing water quality standards on intrastate
waters," citing CWA 9 309(a).140 The next sentence reinforces the
error: "[iln addition to these primary enforcement responsibilities . . . ."141 Since the Court cites 5 309, the EPA enforcement
section, it evidently means enforcement, rather than implementation, of water quality standards. However, 5 309(a) authorizes
~~
9 309 says
EPA enforcement, not state e n f 0 r ~ e m e n t . lMoreover,
nothing about enforcing water quality standards. Finally, 5 309
does not withhold from the EPA the authority to enforce violations
related to water quality standards on intrastate waters. Indeed, the
of effluent limitations in permits based on water quality standards which require allocation.
CWA 5 303(e)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(e)(3)(A) (2000), requires states to submit planning
processes to the EPA that will assure "effluent limitations. . . at least as stringent as those
required by . . . any applicable water quality standard in effect." Again, it is not apparent
how a state could develop and submit an effluent limitation for a point source that did not
yet exist. CWA 5 304(1)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. 5 1314(1)(1)(C), is more explicit, requiring states
to submit individual control strategies to meet water quality standards for "point sources
discharging any toxic pollutant" (emphasis added). The present tense verb suggests that
allocations are to be made for presently operating point sources.
135 Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 108.
136 The EPA had found that the new discharge would result in a theoretical but nondetectable impact on water quality at the state line, but the EPA had interpreted the CWA
not to require denial of the permit because of such impact. The Court could have deferred
to the agency's interpretation of the statute in this regard.
I37 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
138 Id. at 704.
139 Id. at 704, 714.
I4O Id. at 707 (citing CWA 5 309(a), 33 U.S.C 5 1319(a) (emphasis added)).
141 Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
142 The Court may have been referring to the notice the EPA is to give the state in
advance of a federal enforcement action under CWA 5 309(a)(l), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(a)(l),
but this does not authorize state enforcement. Indeed, its only direction for the EPA is to
enforce if the state does not enforce. While the implication is that if the state does enforce,
the EPA should refrain from doing so, the EPA is not obliged to defer to state action, for
the EPA can enforce under CWA 5 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1314(a)(3), without giving the
state prior notice.
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statute does not distinguish between interstate and intrastate
waters for either water quality standards or enforcement purposes.
In addition to its mistake on enforcement, the Court states that the
EPA establishes technology-based standards, while the states
establish, implement, and enforce water quality standards.143 This
ignores the delicate pas de deux Congress established between the
EPA and states in establishing water quality standards, in which the
EPA plays important and critical r01es.l~~
PUD No.1 arose in the context of a CWA 3 401, 33 U.S.C.
8 1341, state certification. Section 401 requires the applicant for a
federal license or permit resulting in a discharge to navigable water
to secure from the state in which the discharge will occur a certification that it will meet applicable federal and state water pollution
control requirements. The applicant in the case proposed to build
a hydroelectric project. The state had designated the water quality
use for the river in question as salmon propagation. The state
included in its 3 401 certification a condition that the hydroelectric
facility only withdraw from the river an amount of water that
would leave a designated minimum flow in the river calculated to
be sufficient for fish propagation.
Implementing water quality standards is normally a four step
process: 1) designating a use for the water body, 2) developing criteria (usually numeric) for the maximum loading of a pollutant
allowed in the water body to assure it is safe for the designated use,
3) determining the maximum daily load of the pollutant that can be
present without violating the criteria, and 4) allocating among dischargers to the water body the burden of eliminating any of the
pollutant in excess of the maximum daily load. The parties in this
PUD NO. 1, 511 U.S. at 704.
States designate uses of water bodies, although the EPA must approve them. However, Congress directed the EPA to develop water quality criteria. CWA § 304(a), 33
U.S.C. 3 1314(a) (2000). The EPA has developed criteria for a range of pollutants and
water conditions that may be applied with various use designations. See Environmental
Protection Agency Water Quality Standards Database, http:llwww.epa.govlwqsdatabasel
(last visited Nov. 21, 2005). The EPA's regulations governing the review and approval of
state water quality standards indicate that the EPA will approve a state criterion for which
there is a federal criterion only if the state criterion is identical to the federal criterion or if
the state demonstrates that the difference is scientifically justified. 40 C.F.R. 3 131.11(b)
(2002). Congress directed the EPA to establish water quality standards for states if the
EPA determines that a state has not established their own water quality standards that
meet the CWA's requirements. CWA $9 303(b), 303(c)(4), and 304(1)(3), 33 U.S.C.
$5 1313(b), 1313(c)(4), and 1314(1)(3) (2000). When the EPA issues a permit under 5 402,
33 U.S.C. 1342 (2000), it uses water quality standards as a basis for effluent limitations.
In addition, when the EPA enforces against violations of a permit's effluent limitations, the
limitations may be based on water quality standards.
143

1"
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case and the Justices became embroiled in a dispute over whether
the state's procedure in PUD No.1 was in accordance with this
four-step process for implementing water quality standards. Petitioners and the minority argued that permit conditions must be
based on criteria, while the minimum flow requirement was based
on the designated use.145The Court ultimately decided that permit
conditions could be based on designated uses.14" But the dispute
was groundless. None of the parties or Justices recognized that the
state had followed the normal procedure. It designated a use for
the river, established flow as a criterion necessary to assure the
designated use, and allocated all of the burden for maintaining that
minimum flow to the power plant. The only irregularity here.was
that the state did not submit the flow criterion to the EPA for
appr0va1.l~~
These misperceptions about water quality standards were not
critical to the Court's decision in PUD No. 1;the Court could have
reached the same conclusions based on a better understanding of
the statutory scheme.148 Its misapplication of "enforcement" to
water quality standards, however, again suggests they can be
enforced without being translated into a permit effluent limitat i ~ n This
. ~ ~
runs
~ counter to the strategy of the statute in two
regards. First, compliance with a permit is compliance with the
statute for most
When the EPA issues the permit, the
PUD NO.1, 511 U.S. at 714.
Id. at 717-18.
14' Although CWA 5 303(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(d)(2) (2000), requires states to submit
their water quality uses and criteria to the EPA for approval, CWA 5 510,33 U.S.C. 5 1360
(2000), also preserves the rights of the states to have water pollution controls more stringent than federal requirements. In the absence of EPA approval of the flow criterion, the
state's flow limitation is more stringent than federal requirements. Query whether flow is
a legitimate criterion; criteria normally are pollutants. The EPA routinely limits flow as an
effluent limitation in permits, although effluent limitations are normally for pollutants as
well. For instruction in how flow limitations are used in permits, see OFFICEOF WATER,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,EPA-833-B-96-003, U.S. EPA NPDES PERMITWRITERS'
GUIDE(1998).
148 The enforceability of water quality standards, except as used to develop conditions in
a permit, had nothing to do with the issue before the Court. The question of whether
permit conditions can be based on uses rather than criteria is a red herring. Flow is used
here as a criterion. The real question is whether the state can use that criterion if the EPA
has not approved it; CWA 9 510,33 U.S.C. 5 1370 (2000), (preserving the states' authority
to have water pollution requirements more stringent than the federal requirements) suggests that it can.
149 Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 1995)
(stating that "Congress intended to confer citizens standing to enforce water quality standards" (citing PUD No. 1 , 511 U.S. at 714-22).
I50 CWA Q 402(k), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(k) (2000).
145
146
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government, the discharger and the public come to closure on what
water pollution control is expected of the discharger, who is not to
be faced thereafter with different or additional requirements until
the permit is modified or reissued. Second, the courts are not to be
left enforcing indefinite requirements, as they were when the federal common law of nuisance held sway.151 If enforcers may sue
dischargers for violating water quality standards before the administrative agencies have completed the four-step process for developing conditions in permits necessary to achieve water quality
standards-thus determining what water quality standards demand
from the particular discharger-the courts must complete that process and make that determination. Courts have no expeitise for
that task, and therefore, Congress has assigned that task to the
administrative agencies.

3. Section 401 State Certification
The Court also misunderstands CWA 5 401,33 U.S.C. 5 1341. In
California Board, states challenged the EPA's disapproval of state
permit programs insofar as they applied to federally owned water
~~
other things, the states argued they
pollution ~ 0 u r c e s . lAmong
could not effectively include their requirements in water pollution
permits for federally owned sources unless states with approved
permit programs issued permits to those sources. The Court could
have avoided a protracted analysis153simply by noting that CWA
5 401 authorized states to require the EPA to include state requirements in permits that the EPA issues. The Court was aware of
9 401; indeed, it cited the section,154but it evidently did not know
how to use it. The government's brief may have misled the Court
in this regard.155
151 As the Court observed in Milwaukee II, "Congress has not left the formulation of
appropriate federal standards to the courts through application of often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the
field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an
expert administrative agency." 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981). Similarly, the Senate Report for
the 1972 legislation commented that citizen suits would not substitute a 'common law' or
court-developed definition of water quality. An alleged violation of an effluent control
limitation or standard, would not require reanalysis of technological. . . [or] other considerations at the enforcement stage. These matters will have been settled in the administrative procedure leading to the establishment of such effluent control provision.
S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 79 (1971).
152 EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
153 Id. at 211-27.
154 Id. at 227 n.42.
155 Brief for the United States at 33, California Board, 426 U.S. 200 (No. 74-1435), 1975
WL 173540 (stating that 5 401 provides "no federal agency 'shall be deemed to be an appli-
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cant for the purposes of' Section 401(a); in short, unlike other pollutant sources, federal
facilities are not to be subject to state certification . . . . See Section 401(a)(6)"). The
quoted language does not exist in 9 401(a)(6) or elsewhere in the section. If it did, it would
merely reiterate that 9 401(a) places the responsibility for obtaining a 1 401 certification on
the applicant for a federal permit, rather than on the federal permit issuing agency. It does
not alter that allocation of responsibility when the permit applicant is a federal facility.
The government argued that "when Congress had the opportunity to subject federal
facilities to state control" it refused to do so. Brief for the United States at 33, California
Board, 426 U.S. 200 (No. 74-1435), 1975 WL 173540. The main supports for that argument
were the exclusions for federal facilities from the EPA's authority to: first, delegate to
states enforcement of new source standards to states, CWA 9 306(c), 33 U.S.C. 9 1316(c);
and second, authorize state inspection and monitoring by states, CWA 9 308(c), 33 U.S.C.
5 1318 (c). These curious provisions were apparently copied from the Clean Air Act
("CAA") without considering their appropriateness in the CWA. The initial version of the
CAA in 1970 did not establish a federal permit system which qualified states could administer upon EPA approval. The CWA, of course, did establish such a permitting system.
Although the Court interpreted the CWA initially to preempt states with approved programs from issuing permits to federal facilities, as noted in California Board, 426 U.S. at
215-16, Congress soon amended the statute to make it clear states with approved programs
were authorized to do so. See CWA 9 313(a)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. 9 1323(a)(2)(A). How are
states to issue permits to federal new sources without applying the new source standards
required by the CWA consistently with 9 306(c), 33 U.SC. 9 1316(c)? On its face, there
appears to be no need for delegating the EPA's inspection authority in CWA 9 308, 33
U.S.C. 9 1318, to states. States have their own statutory inspection authorities and the
state authorities must be comparable to the federal authorities for the EPA to approve a
state permit program. CWA Q 401(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. 9 1341(b)(2)(B). On the other
hand, the waiver of sovereign immunity in CWA 9 313,33 U.S.C. 9 1323, does not include
a waiver for state inspections. Perhaps CWA 9 308(c), 33 U.S.C. 9 1318(c), is a waiver of
sovereign immunity if the EPA approves a state inspection program. This is the only possible interpretation that would lead a state to secure the EPA's approval for such a program.
The EPA has never promulgated procedures for states t o secure such approval. In any
event, the specific exclusion of federal facilities from approved state programs in approved
state 9 306 and 9 308 programs cuts against the government's argument that 9 401 does not
include state certification for federal facilities when 9 401 contains no specific exclusion for
federal facilities.
The government's secondary support was the provision in 9 401(a)(6) that a federal
agency not "be deemed to be an applicant for the purpose of 9 401(a)," depriving states the
authority to certify conditions in permits issued to federal facilities. Brief for the United
States at 33, California Board, 426 U.S. 200 (No. 74-1435), 1975 W L 173540. The brief
implies that the purpose of CWA 9 401 is for states to certify that 9 402 permits meet
federal standards, not mentioning that it applies t o permits issued under all federal statutes, not just under CWA § 402, or that states are also to certify that applicants meet the
requirements of state law. Id. CWA 9 401(a) requires the applicant for a federal permit,
not the federal permitting authority, to secure the state certification. Taken in context, the
passage in CWA 9 401(a)(6) that the government quotes in its brief merely reiterates that
the onus is not on the federal permit issuing agency but on the permit applicant to apply
for a state certification. Accepting the government's main argument that Congress did not
intend in CWA Q 313, 33 U.S.C. 8 1323, to waive federal sovereign immunity for states to
issue permits to federal facilities, Congress clearly did intend to waive sovereign immunity
for the application of appropriate state laws to federal facilities, which the government
admits in its brief. Id. at 15-16. Interpreting 9 313 to exempt federal facilities from 9 401
certifications makes no sense, for it robs states of their only opportunity to assert those
state laws.

Heinonline - - 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 155 2005-2006

156

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 24:125

In California Board, the Court merely failed to use CWA $ 401.
In PUD No. 1,the only opinion interpreting the section, the Court
misunderstood it. CWA $ 401(a) requires applicants for federal
licenses and permits involving a discharge to navigable water to
secure from the state in which the discharge originates a certification that it will meet federal and state water pollution requirements. Subsection (d) authorizes the certifying state to set forth
effluent and other limitations necessary to assure the applicant will
meet the requirements of the CWA and other appropriate state
laws. The certificate conditions must become conditions of the federal permit. The first major issue in PUD No. 1was whether conditions in a $ 401 certification must relate to the discharge resulting
in $ 401 jurisdiction or may be related to non-discharge aspects of
the permit.lS6
The hydroelectric project had two discharges: the discharge into
a river of material to construct a dam and the post-construction
discharge into the river of water that had been diverted from the
river to generate electricity.lS7 The certification condition had
nothing to do with either discharge; instead, it specified the amount
of water that had to remain in the river between the diversion of
water to generate electricity and its return to the river.lS8 In
essence, this was a condition on intake rather than discharge, i.e.,
no water may be withdrawn from the river that would reduce its
flow below the minimum necessary to sustain the propagation of
fish.
Subsection 401(a) requires license or permit applicants to secure
certifications that "any such discharge will comply," while $ 401(d)
authorizes a certification "to set forth any effluent limitations and
other limitations . . . necessary to assure that any applicant. . . will
comply" (emphasis added). The dissent points out the logical
implication that if only discharges require certifications, certifications may impose conditions only on discharges. The Court, however, held that (a) was $ 401's jurisdictional provision, establishing
the type of activities that required the applicant to secure a certification, while (d) was its implementing provision, establishing the
type of conditions states could impose on applicants in
certifications.lS9
156 PUD
(1994).
157 Id. at
1% Id. at
159 Id. at

NO. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 708-11
711.
709-11.
711-14.
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While the Court's interpretation appears to hang together, it
ignores two important aspects of 9 401. First, Congress initially
enacted 9 401(a) without 9 401(d).160 Did the Court assume that
the section could not be implemented until Congress added
9 401(d)? On the contrary, from the outset 9 401 provided that no
federal license or permit requiring certification can issue unless the
state grants a certification or waives its right to certify. This meant
that if an applicant did not comply with a relevant requirement, no
certification could be made and no permit could issue, even though
an applicant not then meeting a requirement could come into compliance if given a reasonable compliance schedule. That fully
implemented 9 401(a). Under the amended provision, a state
could include in its certification a condition that an applicant, not
then in compliance, come into compliance with the required standard within a reasonable time. While the addition of 5 401(d)
makes it easier for applicants to obtain 9 401 certifications, the
Court interpreted it to expand states' authority to include certification conditions not related to the discharge. Nothing in the legislative history of either the original 9 401 in 1970 or the addition of
9 401(d) in 1972 hints that Congress thought 9 401 was unimplemented as initially enacted, or intended 9 401 (d) to implement the
remainder of the section. Finally, the scant legislative history suggests that Congress intended 9 401(d) to relate to discharge^.'^^
Second, both 9 401(a) and (d) list specific sections of the statute
for which the state is to certify compliance and develop conditions
required for compliance. The first sentence of 9 401(a) requires
the state to certify that the discharge will comply with sections 301,
302, 303, 306, and 307.162 All of these sections relate to dis-

160 Congress initially enacted
401(a) in the Water and Environmental Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-244,84 Stat. 91,107-10, designating it as § 21(b)
in 103. In 1972, Congress redesignated 5 21(b) as 5 401 and added 5 401(d), Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500. 86 Stat. 816,
877-80.
161 The chief sponsor of the 1972 legislation commented that "Sections 401 and 402 provide for controls over discharges." 117 CONG.REC. 38,797, 38,855 (1971) (statement of
Sen. Muskie). The Senate Report saw little change in the 1970 legislation by the 1972
amendments. "This is substantially § 21(b) of existing law . . . amended to assure the bill's
changed emphasis from water quality standards to effluent limitations." S. REP. NO. 92414, at 69 (1971). It evidently considered the addition of 402(d) to flesh out the earlier
part of the section. "Existing law is further modified by section 401 of this bill to include a
definition of certification." Id. The EPA did not see a significant change either. "Section
401 is essentially the same as the present section 21(b)." H. REP. NO. 92-911, at 165 (1972).
162 33 U.S.C. 80 1311-1313,1316 and 1317 (2000).
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charges.'63 Subsection (d) omits 9 303 (relating to water quality
standards) from its list but adds "any other appropriate requirement of state law." This raises two issues. First, could it mean that
8 401(a) requires denial of a permit to a source presently out of
compliance with water quality standard-based requirements, without the possibility of a § 401(d) condition that it come into compliance with those requirements? That would undercut 5 401(d)'s
effect of making it easier for permit applicants to obtain certifications. .It also appears to be contrary to the scant legislative history.164Second, what is an "other appropriate requirement of state
law" in 8 401(d)? That is a potentially open-ended field.165 The
easiest answer to both questions is that water quality standards
developed under § 303 and "appropriate requirements of state
law" are the same thing. This allows states to issue certifications to
sources not presently meeting water quality standard requirements
by conditioning permits on meeting them with a reasonable compliance schedule. It also bounds a potentially open-ended field of
state requirements. In any event, sections 301, 302, 303, 306 and
307 all define effluent limitations for point source discharges. The
familiar cannon of statutory interpretation, ejustem generis, suggests that the last of five items in a list be read as similar to the
preceding four items,166i.e., that "appropriate requirement of state
law" also be read as relating to discharges.
4. Multiple Mistakes and Omissions
The interpretive errors discussed above involve the most difficult
concepts in the CWA, those revolving around water quality standards and one of the more arcane concepts in the statute, state
certification. If the Court had trouble with them, it is not surpris163 CWA Q 301, 33 U.S.C. Q 1311, establishes effluent limitations to be met by point
source discharges. CWA Q 302, 33 U.S.C. Q 1312 (2000), authorizes variances for point
source discharges. CWA 9 303, 33 U.S.C. Q 1313 (2000), establishes water quality standards, but the only place the CWA uses them is in determining effluent limitations for
point source permits in Q 301(b)(l)(C), 33 U.S.C. Q 1311(b)(l)(C) (2000). CWA Q 306,33
U.S.C. Q 1316 (2000), establishes performance standards for new point source discharges.
CWA Q 307, 33 U.S.C. Q 1317 (2000), authorizes toxic discharge standards for point source
discharges and pretreatment standards for industries discharging into municipal sewage
treatment point source discharges.
164 "[A] state may attach to any Federally issued license or permit such conditions as
may be necessary to assure compliance with water quality standards in that state." 117
CONG.REC. 33,692, 33,698 (1972).
165 In American Rivers Inc., v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 129 F.3d 99, 103
(2nd Cir. 1997), for instance, the state certification required construction of a fish passage,
a canoe portage, and both minimum and maximum flow rates.
See WILLIAMN. ESKRIDGE,
JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION,
323 (1994).
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ing. But they are not the only provisions of the CWA that the
~ ~ ~ disturbing are decisions in which
Court m i s u n d e r ~ t o o d . More
the Court made multiple errors in construing the statute. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo (Romero-Barce10)l~~
and Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation ( G ~ a l t n e y are
)~~~
the primary examples of this. Although Sea C l a m m e r ~ land
~~
Dague171 made serious errors, they did not make multiple errors.
Moreover, Dague did not butcher the statute directly as did the
other decisions, but it is based on such a self-serving fantasy it is
worth n ~ t i n g . " ~
See supra notes 98-101.
456 U.S. 305 (1982).
484 U.S. 49 (1987).
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 64 (1989).
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
In Dague the Court held that the award of costs "(including reasonable attorney . . .
fees)" to successful citizen suit plaintiffs under 5 505(d), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(d), is to be calculated by multiplying reasonable hours spent on the case by reasonable hourly rates, with no
enhancement for success. Dague, 505 U.S. at 561-62. The argument for an enhancement
for success is that it compensates for time spent on unsuccessful cases, for which no fee
awards are authorized. This is similar to contingent fee arrangements for plaintiffs' attorneys in torts cases.
The Court did not examine the words o r structure of the statute or determine the legislative intent behind the "reasonable attorney's fees" language found in CWA 5 505(d), 33
U.S.C. 5 1365(d). The Court did not even take into account the American Rule that each
party pays its own attorney fees or the Court's own gloss that statutory departures from
this rule should be interpreted narrowly. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 269-71 (1975). Instead, the Court constructed an opinion based on fantasy
economics of legal practice. The opinion began reasonably enough by acknowledging the
two common types of attorney fee arrangements. Dague, 505 U.S. at 560-61. The first is
the lodestar fee arrangement, used by most defense lawyers and lawyers engaged in nonlitigation matters. In lodestar arrangements, hours spent on the matter are multiplied by
the lawyer's hourly rate without regard to outcome. The second is the contingent fee
arrangement, which is used by most plaintiffs' lawyers, especially in tort cases. In contingent fee arrangements, lawyers are paid an agreed upon percentage of the award in successful cases and are not paid in unsuccessful cases.
The Court notes that enhancement of lodestar fees is meant to compensate for risk of
loss. Id. at 562. It posits that risk is a product of "(1) the legal and factual merits of the
claim, and (2) the difficulty of establishing those merits." Id. Because these two factors
are closely related, it is not apparent how they can be multiplied. That aside, the Court
assumes, with no authority, that the second factor is already calculated into the lodestar,
either in the hourly rate charged or the number of hours spent. If that assumption were
true, to enhance the lodestar for risk would be duplicative. This, of course, addresses only
lodestar fees, not contingent fees. But even with lodestar fees, it is pure fantasy. Attorneys using the lodestar fee arrangement establish their hourly rates based on experience or
prominence in the field, not by the difficulty of the case. Moreover, the hours spent on a
case are more related to the number and complexity of legal or factual issues than to risk
of loss. The Court's articulated concern was that lodestar enhancement in successful cases
would encourage counsel to accept unmeritorious cases. Id. at 563. That fear, however, is
purely theoretical and does not take into account real world variables: lawyers may lose
meritorious cases; fee awards in successful cases are discretionary; and judges may disallow
167
168
169
170
171
172
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In Romero-Barcelo the Court held that the CWA citizen suit
provision did not require courts to issue injunctions immediately
restraining violations, but left the courts to their traditional equitable discretion to fashion appropriate relief.173 The Governor of
Puerto Rico sued the Secretary of Defense to enjoin practice
bombing by the Navy into the ocean adjacent to an island off the
coast of Puerto Rico, adding pollutants (bombs) to navigable water
(the ocean) from point sources (airplanes) without a CWA permit.174 The trial court held that the Navy violated the CWA, found
that the violations caused no harm to water quality, refused to
immediately enjoin the bombing, and ordered the Navy to immediately apply for a CWA permit.175 In affirming the trial court's
injunction, the Court rested its opinion on: 1) interpreting the EPA
enforcement provision rather than the citizen suit provision at issue
in the case, 2) repeatedly misinterpreting or ignoring CWA provisions, 3) misrepresenting legislative history, and 4) ignoring its
characterizations of the CWA in its earlier opinions.176 Moreover,
as the dissent notes, it mischaracterizes the appellate court's opinion as the "premise for its essay on equitable discretion."177 The
Court's opinion might simply reflect the maxim that bad facts
make bad law. The opinion might also reflect the Court's discomfort with its then recent decision in TVA v. Hill17* that because secportions of fees if they determine that there were unsuccessful or unnecessary excursions
from successful parts of the case. Furthermore, judges may impose sanctions on lawyers
for presenting cases that judges determine are without merit.
The dissent had no trouble determining that the legislative intent of the fee-shifting provision of the citizen suit provision was to ensure "private persons seeking to enforce [environmental] laws could retain competent counsel." Id. at 568 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The dissent recognized that many plaintiffs in such cases could not afford counsel that
charged normal hourly rates in lodestar arrangements. It also recognized that most citizen
suit cases did not involve large money damages paid t o successful plaintiffs, making contingent fee arrangements unattractive for attorneys in those cases. It correctly concluded that
only a lodestar with an enhancement for success would encourage competent counsel to
accept these cases.
173 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 306.
174 Id. at 307-08.
I75 Id. at 308-12.
176 Id. at 311-20.
177 Id. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens pointed out, contrary to the
Court's description, the appellate court "did not hold that the District Court had no discretion in formulating remedies for statutory violations." Id. at 324. Instead, the Court of
Appeals held that the District Court was not free to deny an injunction-by authorizing a
presidential exemption in 9 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a), for national security purposeswhere the violation of the statute was blatant and not merely technical and the violator's
"predicament was foreseen and accommodated by Congress" Id. at 324-25.
178 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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tion 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)179contained a flat
prohibition on the destruction of critical habitats of endangered
species, the trial court had no choice but to enjoin operation of the
TVA's Tellico Dam because it would destroy the sole habitat of the
endangered snail darter. It might also reflect the fact that the
Department of Justice was defending the Secretary of Defense as a
violator of the CWA rather than advocating for the Administrator
of the EPA as the implementer and enforcer of the CWA.180
The Court's main challenge in Romero-Barcelo was to distinguish TVA v. Hill. To do so, it had to demonstrate that the ESA
directed courts to enjoin violations while the CWA did not. The
Court got no help from the citizen suit provisions of the two statutes, under which the plaintiffs in the cases sued, because the provisions in both are virtually identical.181 Instead, the Court
examined the purposes and prohibitions of the two statutes as they
relate to the two cases. The Court stated that the purpose of the
ESA is to preserve endangered species and the only way to protect
the snail darter was to enjoin operation of the Tellico Dam. By
contrast, the Court stated that the goal of the CWA is clean water
and the CWA may be enforced with either civil penalties or criminal fines.18' This is an apples to oranges comparison. Moreover, it
is flawed. The Court implies that injunctive relief was the only
enforcement remedy available under the ESA while other options
were available under the CWA. However, the ESA authorizes
enforcement by civil penalties and criminal fines just as the CWA
does.ls3 Furthermore, the plaintiff could not have used civil penalties or criminal fines as enforcement mechanisms under either statute. The statutes simply do not authorize private citizens, even
governors, to initiate federal criminal prosecutions. Additionally,
the Court has held that there is no waiver of sovereign immunity
by the United States for the assessment of civil penalties for violations of the CWA by federal fa~i1ities.l~~
16 U.S.C. 5 1536.
The author first developed this analysis of Romero-Barcelo in JEFFERY G . MILLER,
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Sheldon Novick ed., Clark Boardman 1987) § 8.01 (8)(b)(iii).
181 See ESA 5 ll(g)(l), 16 U.S.C. 5 1540(g)(l), and CWA 8 505(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a).
Both statutes authorize courts to "enforce" the statutes, although the ESA's provision
authorizes citizens to commence actions to "enjoin" violations of the statute.
182 Romero-Bnrcelo, 456 U.S. at 314. The Court used the phrase "fines and criminal
penalties" rather than the usual nomenclature of fines for criminal sanctions and penalties
for civil sanctions.
183 ESA 5 ll(a)-(b), 16 U.S.C. 5 1540(a)-(b).
la United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
179
I*
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To be sure, the prohibitory injunction was necessary in TVA v.
Hill to accomplish the purpose of the ESA, the preservation of an
endangered species, while a prohibitory injunction was not necessary in Romero-Barcelo to accomplish the purpose of the CWA,
the preservation of water quality, because the trial court found that
the practice bombing did not adversely affect water quality. The
decisions do not reflect differences between the statutes; they
reflect a difference in the facts. While the bombing with no permit
may not have disturbed water quality, it thumbed its nose at the
basic prohibition of the CWA and was an affront to the CWA's
permit system. The Court dismissed this concern with a terse
"[tlhe integrity of the Nation's waters . . . not the permit process, is
the purpose of the" CWA.lS5 While this is undoubtedly true, it
ignores the centrality of the permit system in achieving the integrity of the Nation's waters, a centrality critical to the Court's analysis and outcome in other CWA decisions.186 As the dissent in
Romero-Barcelo points out, the effect of the decision, in essence, is
to allow courts to amend the basic prohibition of the statute by
authorizing particular discharges to continue without permits.Is7
Moreover, it does so when courts find that the discharges do not
adversely affect water quality, a determination Congress committed to the EPA and its state counterparts rather than to courts.188
The Court also reasoned that judicial discretion in granting
injunctions is consistent with the structure of the statute, finding
support in the sequential requirements that industry achieve BPT
in 1977 and BAT in 1983 coupled with the goal of eliminating the
discharge of pollutants by 1985.Is9 The Court concluded that
"[tlhis scheme of phased compliance further suggests that this is a
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 314.
The Court first noted the centrality of the permit system in achieving the CWA's
purpose in EPA v. California ex ref. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200
(1976). In Milwaukee II, the Court found the CWA, as manifested in the permit system, so
comprehensively addressed water pollution that it preempted the operation of a federal
common law of nuisance in interstate water pollution. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304
(1981). Finally, in Ouellette, the Court found the CWA preempted the common law of
nuisance of states affected by water pollution originating in other states, because it would
interfere with the administration of the CWA's permit system. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987).
'87 456 U.S. at 323.
18s The permit writer is to include in permits effluent limitations sufficient to achieve
water quality standards. CWA 5 301(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(b)(l)(B). The state is to
certify what permit conditions will achieve water quality standards. CWA 5 401,33 U.S.C.
5 1341.
'89 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 316-17 (discussing CWA 5 301(b), 33 U.S.C.
55 1311(b)).
18s

186

Heinonline - - 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 162 2005-2006

20051

Supreme Court Water Jurisprudence

163

statute in which Congress envisioned, rather than curtailed, the
~~
non sequitur. Congress did not
exercise of d i s c r e t i ~ n . " ' Another
include one bit of discretion in its requirements that industry
achieve BPT by 1977 or BAT by 1983, and it did not incorporate its
zero discharge objective by 1985 into any requirement of the statute. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that it had held "some standards related to phased compliance" to be absolute, citing EPA v.
National Crushed Stone Ass'n ("Crushed Stone").lY1 While Congress granted EPA some discretion to vary these deadlines,19*it did
not grant courts the discretion to do so, a distinction acknowledged
by the Court in an earlier action.lY3
The Court next posits that a wording difference between two
EPA injunctive authorities, CWA sections 309 and 504, evidence
retention of traditional judicial equitable discretion to issue injunctions under section 309. The Court does not explain how these two
EPA authorities govern injunctive relief in citizen suits. Worse, the
distinction the Court makes between sections 309 and 504 simply
does not exist. The Court observes that section 504 "directs . . .
EPA to seek an injunction to restrain immediately discharges of
pollutants [it] finds to be presenting 'an imminent and substantial
endangerment.'
The Court then notes that 8 504 "is limited to
the indicated class of violations" while other types of violations are
addressed by 8 309(b), which authorizes EPA to seek "appropriate
relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction."195 "The
provision makes clear that Congress did not anticipate that all dischargers would be immediately enjoined."196 However, in 9 504,
Id. at 316.
191 Id. at 316 n.11 (citing EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n., 449 U.S. 64 (1980)).
192 Congress granted the EPA discretion to extend the date for achieving BAT under
some circumstances in CWA $0 301(c) and 302, 33 U.S.C. $0 1311(c) and 1312. Similarly,
when the 1977 deadline for BPT passed with some dischargers failing to comply through no
fault of their own, Congress granted the EPA discretion to extend the compliance deadline
to dischargers meeting specified factors in CWA 00 301(i) and 309(a)(5)(B), 33 U.S.C.
$5 1311(i) and 1319(a)(5)(B).
193 Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 434 U.S. 1030 (1978). The EPA vetoed a state-issued
permit because it allowed compliance with BPT after 1977. The Sixth Circuit overturned
the EPA's veto as improper. On appeal by the EPA, the Court remanded the case to the
Sixth Circuit to be reconsidered in light of a recent amendment to the CWA, giving the
EPA discretion to extend the deadline in consideration of specified factors, implying that
Congress gave the EPA, not courts, discretion to extend the deadline. The Sixth Circuit
ultimately reversed itself, holding that the 1977 deadline could not be extended by courts.
Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1978).
194 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 317.
195 Id. (emphasis added)
196 Id. at 317-18.
190
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Congress merely provided that the EPA "may bring suit . . . to
immediately restrain" an endangerment.19' Congressional use of
"may" authorizes the EPA to seek an injunction; it does not mandate that it do so. Also, it does not require the court to grant one.
Moreover, 5 504 authority does not arise when a statutory violation
causes an endangerment, as the Court stated, but rather whenever
water pollution causes an endangerment, regardless of whether it
violates the CWA.
The final piece of evidence that the Court adduced was that the
Senate Report for the 1972 Amendments indicated the "enforcement procedures" of the CWA were drawn extensively from the
"enforcement provisions of the Refuse Act of 1899" and that
"[v]iolations of the Refuse Act have not automatically led courts to
issue injunction^."'^^ There are four problems with this argument.
First, the quoted language from the Senate Report discussed the
CWA's EPA enforcement provisions in 9 309, not the CWA citizen
suit provision in $ 505, under which the Romero-Barcelo case was
filed and decided. Second, the Refuse Act of 1899 provided
enforcement remedies for the government, not for citizens, while
Romero-Barcelo was a citizen suit. Third, the Refuse Act cases the
Court cited all post-dated the 1972 CWA amendments; thus, the
proposition that injunctions were not automatic under the Refuse
Act was not before Congress when it enacted the CWA.lg9 Finally,
the proposition for which the Court cited the Senate Report simply
was not in the Senate Report.zoo
The opinion's penultimate paragraph states:
197
198
'99

CWA 5 504, 33 U.S.C 5 1364 (emphasis added).
Id. at 319 (citing S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 62 (1971)).
Id. (citing Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), U.S. v. Rohm &

Haas Co.. 500 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1974), and U.S. v. Kennebec Log Driving Co., 491 F.2d
572 (1st Cir. 1973)).
2" The Court quoted the Senate Report as saying "[i]n writing the enforcement procedures involving the Federal Government the Committee drew extensively . . . upon the
existing enforcement provisions of the Refuse Act of 1899." Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at
319. The Report actually says that the Committee based the EPA's enforcement provision
in the CWA on the Refuse Act and the EPA's enforcement provision in the then recently
enacted Clean Air Act. S. REP.NO. 92-414, at 63 (1971). Neither The Refuse Act nor the
CAA specified that courts had discretion in issuing injunctions. Moreover, there was a
significant difference between the enforcement provisions of the CAA and the Refuse Act.
The CAA authorized the EPA to enforce only if it gave notice of its intent to the state
thirty days in advance and the violation continued beyond the thirtieth day with the state
taking no action. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 5 113(a), 84 Stat.
1676, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 5 7413(a)). The Refuse Act had no such notice
requirement. See 33 U.S.C. 5 407. Read in context, the Senate Committee Report indicates that it relied on the Refuse Act to give the EPA authority in the CWA to enforce
without the prior notice required under the CAA. Nowhere in the quoted portion of the
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[tlhe District Court did not face a situation in which a permit would very likely not issue, and the requirements and
objective of the statute could therefore not be vindicated if
discharges were permitted to continue. Should it become
clear that no permit will be issued and that compliance with
the [CWA] will not be forthcoming, the statutory scheme
and purpose would require the court to reconsider the balance it had stru~k.~"

This rescues the Court's decision, if not its reasoning. Ultimately, courts must require compliance with the CWA; if they do
not, they effectively amend it, violating separation of powers
principles.202
Taken as a whole, the Court's opinion suggests that when an
injunction is sought to require compliance with a federal statute,
courts have an obligation to require compliance with the statute,
but have considerable discretion in how they achieve that end.
That is not a startling proposition. The perplexing question is why
the Court so mangled the CWA to get this conclusion. The probable answer is that the United States suggested all of the misinterpretations of the CWA in its brief.203 Why would the EPA suggest
such blatant misinterpretations of a statute it administers creating
misinterpretations that could come back to haunt it? The answer is
that the EPA did not and probably would not. The Department of
the Navy was a party to the brief with the Solicitor General while
the EPA was not. Congress entrusted the EPA, not the Depart-

-

-

-

-

Senate Report is there a suggestion that courts have discretion in issuing injunctions. See
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 63-65 (1971).
201 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320.
202 The Court implied as much in its remand of Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 434 U.S.
1030 (1978). See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1976).
203 "The different result in TVA v. Hill was due to the specific characteristics of the statute and the factual situation there before the Court" Brief for Petitioner United States at
11, Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (No. 80-1990), 1981 WL 390223 (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, page 12 in the original document is missing. However, on page 13, the brief
explained the factual differences between the two cases. Presumably the brief gave the
Court its template for the legal differences. "The Act sets out a . . . phased system of
pollution abatement . . . [Rlemedial flexibility will sometimes be needed to avoid unnecessary hardship." Id. at 16. "Congress . . . provided for a phased program . . . [i]t is entirely
consistent with this statutory scheme for the district courts to provide for some flexibility in
the timing of compliance." Id. at 19. The brief also contrasted enforcement under CWA
sections 309 and 504 on page 15, note 16. It accurately rephrased and quoted Q 504 without
making the same mistakes as the Court. Id. at 15-16. Furthermore, the brief suggested
that the Senate Report indicated that CWA Q 309 was based on the Refuse Act of 1899 and
the injunctions were not automatic under the Refuse Act. Id. at 16. In support of this
proposition the brief cited the same post-1972 Refuse Act decisions cited by the Court. See
supra note 200.
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ment of the Navy, or the Solicitor General, with interpreting and
implementing the CWA. The problem here is that the United
States was a defendant in a CWA enforcement action, making all
of the arguments a defendant would ordinarily make, regardless of
their implications for the integrity of the statute that it administers
as a plaintiff in an enforcement action or as a defendant in a judicial review action.204
Six years later, the Court in Gwaltney held that CWA
O 505(a)(1)205limited citizen suits to violations that are continuing
or likely to recur.206 The first and primary justification for this
holding is the plain meaning of the present tense verbal phrase "to
be in violation."207 The Court reasoned that by using a present
tense verb, Congress intended to authorize citizen suits for existing
violations and not for wholly past violations.208 The Court bolstered this argument by observing that Congress used the present
tense throughout 5 505.209 It observed that the citizen suit provisions of most other environmental statutes also used the present
tense verbs, demonstrating a consistent legislative intent that citizens could sue only for continuing violations.210 Finally, it noted
that when Congress wanted to authorize citizens to sue for wholly
past violations, it knew how to use language that explicitly "targets
wholly past violations."211 The examples the Court used to support
this assertion are not persuasive.212 Nevertheless, had the Court
204 Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of Department of Justice Control of
Litigation on Agencies' Programs, 52 ADMIN.L. REV. 1345 (2000).
205 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(1) (authorizing a suit against any person who is alleged "to be in
violation" of the CWA).
206 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
207 Id. at 49, 57.
208 Id. at 57.
209 Id. at 59-60.
210 Id. at 57.
211 Id.
212 The Court cited the citizen suit provision of the Resource, Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 6972(a)(l)(B), authorizing citizens to sue for abatement of present or
future endangerments caused by past or present handling of hazardous waste. Gwaltney,
484 U.S. at 57. This provision does not target wholly past violations, as suggested by the
Court. Id. Instead it authorizes suits to abate endangerments, not violations, and the
endangerments do not have to be caused by violations. The word "violate" and its derivatives occur nowhere in the subparagraph. Moreover, the provision authorizes suits to
abate present or future endangerments, not wholly past endangerments. The Court also
cited EPA authority to assess administrative penalties against a person who "has violated"
the CWA in § 309(g). Id. at 58. Of course, this is an EPA enforcement provision, not a
citizen suit provision. Moreover, the Court interpreted EPA's enforcement authority to
reach wholly past and continuing violations, regardless of the tense Congress used in 5 309,
undercutting the Court's argument that the present tense in 5 505 is limited to continuing
violations. See infra note 213.
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stopped there, its analysis would have been unexceptional and not
Unfortunately, the Court continued with three subsidiary arguments that are faulty and destructive of citizen suits.214
The Court's first subsidiary argument is that the purpose of the
requirement that citizens give a violator notice of their intent to
sue sixty days before filing suit215is to give the violator the opportunity to avoid suit by coming into compliance, a purpose that
would not be served if citizens could sue for wholly past violat i o n ~ But
. ~ ~the
~ provision requires citizens to give notice to the
EPA, the state, and the violator. Notice to the various governments has nothing to do with allowing the violator to avoid suit by
coming into compliance. The legislative history suggests the purpose of prior notice is to provide government prosecutors the first
chance to enforce obviating the need for a citizen suit, not to allow
the violator an opportunity to avoid
Indeed, giving prior
notice to a violator serves several purposes whether its alleged vio213 The Court's holding that citizen suits are limited to continuing violations, based on
the present tense of "alleged to be in violation," Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57, presents a problem in that Congress also used the phrase "is in violation" in CWA 9 309(a), the EPA
enforcement section. Is the EPA also barred from enforcing against wholly past violations? Plaintiffs in Gwaltney argued that it is "little questioned" that the EPA may d o so.
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58. The Court apparently agreed. Id. The Court distinguished the
two situations, by noting that 9 309 authorized injunctions and penalties in separate subsections, while 5 505 authorized them in the same sentence, making them independent remedies in 9 309 and "intertwined" in 5 505. Id. at 58-59. Since injunctions are not warranted
for wholly past violations and injunctions and penalties are intertwined in citizen suits, the
Court reasoned, both injunctions and penalties are appropriate only for continuing violations in citizen suits. Id. at 58. While this argument seems metaphysical, the Court based
its opinion in Tull v. United States on this basis. 481 U.S. 412,425 (1987). However, in Tull
the Court made a distinction in the context of the role of the judge and jury in EPA
enforcement actions. Id. Does the Court in Gwaltney suggest the role of the judge and
jury are different depending on whether the EPA or citizens bring an enforcement action?
Nothing in Gwaltney or Tull suggests that conclusion.
214 The author first developed this analysis in Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in
Statutory Preclusions Against Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and
Citizens Part One: Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 HARV.ENVTL.L. h v . 401,
484-91 (2004).
215 CWA 9 505(b)(l)(A), 33 U.S.C. 9 1365(b)(l)(A).
216 484 U.S. 59-60.
217 The citizen suit provisions of the CWA and other environmental statutes were
modeled on the C A A citizen suit provision and courts commonly resort to the legislative
history of the latter t o inform the former. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 62; United States Dep't of
Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992). The notice and delay provision in the C A A
citizen suit provision originated in the Senate bill and the Senate Report accompanying
that bill explained that the notice "should motivate government agencies . . . to bring
enforcement and abatement proceedings." S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 36-37 (1970), reprinted
in 1 CLEANAIR A c r LEGISLATIVEHISTORY436-37 (1974). The Senate Committee
intended the thirty-day prior notice to "further encourage and provide for agency enforcement," giving the government "an opportunity to act on the alleged violation." Id. at 437.
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lations are present or wholly past. In either case it allows the violator to convince the citizen enforcer that the alleged violations did
not or do not exist, that they were not or are not serious, or that
they have ceased or soon will cease, making a lawsuit pointless.
Even if the violator fails to dissuade a citizen from filing suit, the
notice affords the violator the opportunity to begin negotiating a
settlement, sparing itself and the courts prolonged litigation.
While the Court's first subsidiary argument is not as convincing
as its plain meaning analysis, its second subsidiary argument is seriously flawed and has had a pernicious effect on citizen suit jurisprudence. The focus of this argument is that citizen suits
"supplement rather than . . . supplant government action"218 and
the citizen suit provision should not be interpreted to change the
"nature of the citizen's role from interstitial to potentially intru~ i v e . "The
~ ~ Court's
~
contrast between the meanings of "supplement" and "supplant" implies a linguistic precision that does not
exist. According to the Court, citizen suits are to "supplement"
government enforcement. "Supplement" means "to add to."220
Citizen enforcers add to government enforcers. A citizen action
cannot add to a government action unless the government has
taken an action; if the government has not taken an action, there is
nothing for the citizen suit to add to. But $ 505(b)(l)(B) bars the
citizen suit if the government has already taken an enforcement
action in
"Supplant" means "to take the place of."222 If
the government does not take an enforcement action against a violation and a citizen does so, has not the citizen suit taken the place
of a government action? The distinction the Court makes between
"supplement" and "supplant," in the context of citizen suits, does
not support its characterization of citizen suits as secondary
enforcement mechanisms.
The Court's observation that the citizen suit provision should not
be interpreted to allow intrusion on government enforcement
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.
Id. at 61. The Court had commented in Sea Clammers that the EPA enforcement
authority is "supplemented" by the citizen suit provision. Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n 453 U.S. 1,14 (1981). However, the Court in Gwaltney
did not cite Sea Clammers as precedent in this regard. This suggests an engrained view of
citizen enforcement by the Court. As the dissent in Sea Clammers commented, the Court
"has been more and more reluctant to open the courthouse door to the injured citizen."
Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220 WEBSTERS'SSEVENTHNEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY884 (1999).
221 The extent of this bar is not entirely settled. See Miller? supra note 214, at 426-28.
222 WEBSTERS'SSEVENTHNEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY
884 (1999).
218
219
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ignores the very nature of citizen suits. A citizen suit notice may
cause the government to enforce when it otherwise would not
have. When the government does commence a civil action against
a violation in federal court, the citizen suit provision authorizes citizens to intervene in the government's action.223 The citizen suit
provision allows citizens to second-guess the government's
prosecutorial decisions: decisions not to enforce and decisions to
enforce administratively rather than judicially. These outcomes
may be intrusive, but are they not what Congress intended?
Finally, the Court's conclusion that citizen suits for present violations supplement government action and do not intrude on it, while
citizen suits for wholly past violations supplant government action
and do intrude on it, is simply a non sequitur. Citizens suits have
the same effect on government enforcement actions whether the
violations at issue are present or wholly past. While the Court's
second subsidiary argument does not hold together logically or on
its face, the evidence the Court offers to support it is little short of
outrageous: a mischaracterized piece of legislative history;224an
CWA 5 505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B).
223 The Court quoted from the Senate Report accompanying the enactment of the
CWA: "[tlhe Senate Report noted that '[tlhe Committee intends the great volume of
enforcement actions [to] be brought by the State,' and that citizen suits are proper only 'if
the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility."'
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORYOF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROLA a AMENDMENTS
OF 1972 1482
(1973)) (emphasis added). The Court uses the two quoted fragments of the Report as if
they are linked and they explain congressional intent regarding citizen suits. In fact, they
aredrawn from different paragraphs and are parts of the Committee's comments on the
EPA's enforcement provision, CWA 9: 309, rather than on the citizen suit provision, CWA
9: 505. The two paragraphs read:
The Committee . . . notes that the [enforcement] authority of the Federal Government
should be used judiciously by the Administrator in those cases deserve [sic] Federal action
because of their national character, scope, or seriousness. The Committee intends the
great volume of enforcement actions be brought by the State. It is clear that the Administrator is not to establish an enforcement bureaucracy but rather t o reserve his authority for
the cases of paramount interest.
It should be noted that if the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their
enforcement responsibility, the public is provided the right to seek vigorous enforcement
action under the citizen suit provisions of section 505.
HISTORY
OF THE WATER
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIVE
POLLUTIONCONTROLACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1972 1482 (1973). The first paragraph provides congressional intent regarding the relationship between federal and state enforcement, not that citizen suits supplement rather than supplant government enforcement. The
second paragraph does not state or imply that citizen suits are proper only if the various
governments fail to exercise their enforcement responsibilities. Neither paragraph suggests that citizen suits are appropriate against continuing but not against wholly past
violations.
223
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illogical deduction from that evidence;225 and an illogical
hypothetical.
To illustrate the parade of horribles that would ensue if citizens
were allowed to sue for wholly past violations, the Court poses a
hypothetical in which a violator agrees with the EPA to install
unusually expensive and advanced pollution control equipment,
not only bringing the violator into compliance, but protecting the
environment far beyond the applicable legal requirement. In consideration for this action, the EPA agrees not to seek penalties.
The Court concluded that "[ilf citizens could file suit months or
years later, in order to seek civil penalties that the Administrator
chose to forgo, then the Administrator's discretion to enforce the
Act in the public interest would be curtailed ~ o n s i d e r a b l y . "This
~~~
hypothetical does not support the distinction between citizen suits
for continuing and wholly past violations for several reasons.
First, the Court's argument is misdirected. By enacting CWA
$ 505, Congress curtailed the government's ability to assure a violator that it would not be the subject of enforcement. The proper
question is whether Congress curtailed this for wholly past violations. Second, the hypothetical is a red herring. Reported citizen
suit cases simply do not reveal citizens suing in such a situation.227
Third, if the violator spent more on its pollution control equipment
than would normally have been required, it in essence came into
compliance and paid a penalty in the amount of its extra costs. A
court assessing a penalty in a subsequent citizen suit could offset
this amount against the penalty it assesses in the citizen suit, as a
matter which "justice may require," one of the factors courts are to
consider in assessing penalties.228 Fourth, the interference by the
citizen suit with the government's promise not to impose penalties
is the same whether the suit involves continuing or wholly past violations. Fifth, the hypothetical falls apart by simply altering the
hypothetical to reflect a possible scenario in which the government
225 The Court does not explain why citizen suits for wholly past violations undermine the
supplementary role of citizen enforcement, while citizen suits against continuing violations
do not.
226 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61.
227 None of the 125 citizen suit cases surveyed in the article and cited in Miller, supra
note 215, resemble this fact pattern.
228 CWA 5 309(d), 33 U.S.C. 5 1319(d). See Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 1538-40 (D.N.J. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1239
(3rd Cir. 1995), in which plaintiffs seeking penalties in a citizen suit argued the court, in
assessing penalties, should take into account penalties the defendant had already paid to
the government.
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agrees to forego penalties in consideration for the violator installing pollution control equipment that is cheap, outmoded, barely
complies with the permit's current requirements, under-performs
equipment used by the rest of the industry, and is destined to fail in
the near future. Does a citizen suit in that situation offend the
structure or policy of the statute?
Sixth, allowing citizen suits in the situation posed by the Court
does not undercut the government's ability to settle cases on terms
it deems favorable. In the Court's situation, the government got
the benefit of its bargain and the citizen suit does not disturb that
result. If the citizens succeed in having a court assess penalties,
they are paid to the Treasury and the government is doubly benefited. If the government fears that this example will discourage
other violators from entering into settlements with it, the government has sufficiently greater authority than citizen enforcers.229As
a result, violators failing to deal with the government do so at their
peril. Finally, if the government wants to insulate a violator from a
citizen suit, Congress has provided it can do so by embodying the
settlement in a consent decree entered a federal court.230
While the holding in Gwaltney may be justified on plain English
grounds, it is not justified by the Court's other arguments. Yet
these arguments, particularly the characterization of citizen suits as
of secondary importance, have haunted subsequent citizen suits
and been cited by court after court as justification for negative citiThe decision evidences either an extremely
zen suit
sloppy job of statutory interpretation or an unstated desire to close
the courthouse door to injured citizens.232
229 For example, the government may prosecute violators criminally via CWA 5 309(c),
33 U.S.C. 5 1319 (2000); it may inspect violating facilities daily via CWA 5 308, 33 U.S.C.
5 1318 (2000); it may terminate a violator's permit via CWA 5 402(b)(l)(C), 33 U.S.C.
5 1342(b)(l)(C) (2000) (incorporated into the EPA's authority by CWA 5 402(a)(3)); or it
may bar a violator from receiving government grants or contracts via CWA 5 507, 33 U.
S.C. 5 1367 (2000).
230 Under CWA $505(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000), government actions
in court do foreclose citizen suits. There is good reason why a judicial action can bar a
citizen suit, while an administrative order will not. Judicial actions are public, administrative actions may not be. Even a consent decree filed in court is a public document and,
under Department of Justice procedures, requires a public notice and comment period
before entry as a judicial order. 28 C.F.R. $ 50.7 (2004).
231 See Miller, supra note 215, at n.439-441 and accompanying text.
232 Justice Scalia's concurrence, joined by Justices O'Connor and Stevens, was even
more restrictive. Gwatlney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49,67-71 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). While the Court's opinion required the plaintiff to
allege continuing violations in good faith, the concurrence would have required plaintiff to
prove violations occurred at the time the complaint was filed, as a requirement of subject

Heinonline - - 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 171 2005-2006

172

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 24:125

Some might say that the thirteen to ten count of anti- and proenvironmental results in the Court's decisions233self-evidently
demonstrates the Court's anti-environmental bias. They might say
that bias is more self-evident in the eleven to four count of decisions since 1980. That broad proposition, however, does not withstand scrutiny. Two of the thirteen decisions with antienvironmental results involved or avoided constitutional protections or limitations.234 They do not reflect an anti-environmental
bias by the Court unless the proponent argues that the Court
applies the Constitution more strictly under environmental statutes
than under other statutes or that the Constitution should be
applied less stringently under environmental statutes than under
other statutes. Both are dubious propositions. Two of the remaining eleven decisions with anti-environmental results apply federal
sovereign immunity from suits by
derived from the
and invoke the accompaSupremacy Clause of the Con~titution,2~~
matter jurisdiction. Id. It further suggested that if violations did not occur at that time, the
plaintiff suffered no injury at that time and had no standing to file the suit. Id.
233 See infra Table B.
See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County (SWANCC) v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). In Tull
the Court decided that the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution required the
opportunity for a jury decision on whether a defendant violated the CWA before a court
could assess a civil penalty, although the judge retained equitable discretion to fix the
amount of the penalty. 481 U.S. at 425-26. In SWANCC the Court interpreted CWA
5 404 not to require permits to fill isolated wetlands to avoid deciding whether the regulation of isolated wetlands is within congressional authority under the Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl. 2. SWANCC, 531 U.S. .at 174. As an
interpretation of the CWA's "navigable waters" jurisdiction, the opinion is questionable
and can be labeled as having an anti-environmental result. As a means of avoiding the
supra note
constitutional issue, however, it follows traditional judicial doctrine. ESKRIDGE,
166, at 325. Moreover, Professor Lazarus suggests the Court might well have held isolated
wetlands were not within Congress' Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Lazarus, Three Years
Later, supra note 2, at 660-64. Such an outcome would follow in the footsteps of recent
decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (involving a federal statute outlawing possession of firearms near schools), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(involving a federal statute providing a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence), where the Court found that both of these statutes were beyond Congress' Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Under this logic the Court could have held that Commerce
Clause jurisdiction did not extend to isolated wetlands and this holding could not then be
viewed as motivated by anti-environmental bias as much as by a generally restrictive view
of federal authority.
235 United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio ("DOE"), 503 U.S. 607 (1992); EPA v. Cal. ex
rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
236 U.S. CONST.art. VI, 5 2.
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nying cross-cutting judicial doctrine that waivers of sovereign
immunity should be interpreted narrowly.237 Again, they do not
reflect an anti-environmental bias by the Court unless the proponent argues that the Court interprets waivers of sovereign immunity more strictly in environmental statutes than in other statutes
or the proponent argues the Court should interpret waivers of sovereign immunity less strictly in environmental statutes than in
other statutes.238Again, both arguments are dubious. Three of the
remaining nine decisions with anti-environmental results are in
judicial review of EPA final actions.239Each of the three decisions
upheld the EPA7s action, reflecting judicial deference to the
agency's interpretation of the statute it implements. If they reflect
an anti-environmental bias, the bias begins with the EPA, not the
Court. These seven decisions don't reflect an anti-environmental
bias. Instead, they reflect the normal interplay between a statute
and the rest of the legal system.
The remaining six decisions with anti-environmental results240
have much in common. All six were citizen suits or private federal
common law of nuisance actions. By contrast, only one of the
Court's ten decisions with pro-environmental results was a citizen
suit or private federal common law of nuisance action.241All six of
the decisions contained analytical errors, including all of the serious or multiple errors noted.242 By contrast, only four of the
Court's ten decisions with pro-environmental results contained
analytical errors and none of them were serious or multiple.243
Finally, the EPA was not a party in five of the six decisions. By
contrast, the EPA was a party in six of the Court's ten decisions
with pro-environmental results.244 While some of these three factors are also at play in the seven other decisions with anti-environ237 Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983) (citing McMahon v. United
States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)).
238 Justice White's separate opinion, in DOE, 503 U.S. 607, 629 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), however, suggests that if the Court were more
attuned to environmental values, it could have come to a different conclusion.
239 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S.
116 (1985); and Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
240 City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found. 484 U.S. 49 (1987); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481
(1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304 (1981).
z41 See infra Table B.
242 Id.
243 Id.
2M Id.
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mental results and cross-cutting issues, their influence does not
appear to be as great as the nature of the legal issues involved in
those seven decisions.245
This analysis suggests that the anti-environmental bias of the
Court is less than it seems. More than half of its CWA decisions
with anti-environmental results are adequately explained by the
nature of the issues involved, constitutional protections or limitations, sovereign immunity, or judicial review of agency action. In
the remainder of the decisions the results may be explained less by
an anti-environmental bias than by combinations of three other
factors: the nature of the action as a citizen suit or private federal
common law of nuisance action, the EPA's absence as a party, and
the presence of an analytical error.
While this analysis suggests the apparent anti-environmental bias
of the Court is much less than it seems or may not even exist, the
analysis raises two equally disturbing suggestions. One is the
apparent bias of the Court against private enforcement, leading to
anti-environmental decisions and analytical errors. The other is
that the EPA's absence as a party from a case contributes to the
anti-environmental results, particularly when other federal parties
are present as polluting defendants. The most likely redress to a
bias against private enforcement is legislation re-enforcing the
importance of citizen suits, although citizen suit initiatives in
today's Congress probably would not have positive results. The
most likely redress to the absence of the EPA as the federal party
in a suit is legislation requiring federal parties who are violating
defenders to hire special counsel to represent them, leaving the
Solicitor General to represent the EPA as amicus or allowing EPA
to represent itself as amicus. The Department of Justice has an
internal procedure to allow agencies to comment on the Solicitor's
positions regarding statutes they administer, but it does not assure
their interpretations will be adopted by the S o l i ~ i t o r . ~ ~ ~

245 At least one of the three factors was present in all seven decisions. In addition, five
had analytical errors, three did not have the EPA as a party, and one was a citizen suit. See
infra Table B.
246 Interview with John Crudin, Deputy Assistant Att'y General, Envtl. and Natural
Res. Div., Dep't of Justice, in Chi., Ill. (Aug. 7, 2005).
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TABLE A: SUPREME
COURTDECISIONS
UNDER
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY
ADMINISTERED
STATUTES
Clean Water Act
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) ("Arkansas v.
Oklahoma").
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985)
("CMA").
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) ("Dague").
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) ("Milwaukee
11").
Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198 (1980) ("Pacific
Legal Found.").
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980) ("Crown
Simpson").
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) ("E.
I. du Pont").
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board,
426 U.S. 200 (1976) ("California Water Board").
EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U.S. 64 (1989)
("Crushed Stone7').
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) ("Laidlaw").
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484
U.S. 49 (1987) ("Gwaltney ").
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987)
("Ouellette").
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) ("Sea Clammers").
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept. of Ecology,
511 U.S. 700 (1994) ("PUD No. 1").
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ("SWANCC").
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) ("Miccosukee").
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Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) ("City of New
York").
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1
(1976) ("Colorado PIRG").
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) ("Tull").
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985) ("Riverside Bayview").
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) ("Ward").
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992)
("DOE").
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) ("RomeroBarcelo").
Clean Air Act
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. U.S., 434 U.S. 566 (1978).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 742
(2004).
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
Engine Manufacturers Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530 (1990).
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980).
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,
483 U.S. 711 (1987).
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,
478 U.S. 546 (1986).
Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 326
(1994).
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989).
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370
(1987).
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 125 Sup. Ct. 577
(2004).
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
Thomas v. Outboard Marine Corp., 479 U.S. 1002 (1986).
United States v. Best Foods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 Sup. Ct. 1788 (2004).
Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle, 439 U.S. 320 (1979)
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Col, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, 473 U.S. 568
(1985).
Wisconsin Public Intervener v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
Oil Pollution Act
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
Safe Drinking Water Act
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
Heinonline - - 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 177 2005-2006

178

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 24:125

Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370
(1987).

National Environmental Policy Act
Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Actions Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.), 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752
(2004).
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Oklahoma,
426 U.S. 776 (1976).
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460
U.S. 766 (1983).
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
Robertson v. Methew Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223
(1980).
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Actions Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of HawaiiJPeace Education Project,
454 U.S. 139 (1981).
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